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Most U.S. corporations do not pay federal income taxes.1 In 
fact, domestic corporations have become so adept at reducing 
their tax bills that they accounted for less than 10 percent of all 
income taxes collected by the federal government from 2000 
through 2003.2 One might be surprised to discover, then, that 
during the last several years some corporations have been will-
ing to report, and pay over to the Treasury, hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in taxes that they did not owe. Why? Because 
paying the tax helped conceal the fact that those companies 
were playing with Monopoly moneyfabricating profits as 
phony as the bright pastel-colored money used in the classic 
Parker Brothers board game.3 This corporate malfeasance ap-
parently continues to occur with some frequency. Of course, 
when the game was over, those same companies wanted to raid 
the community chest to get their money back by filing tax-
refund claims. The problem with permitting such claims is that 
reporting phony income is as much a tax fraud as is failing to 
report real income.4 The only difference is that the latter is sub-
ject to significant penalties, while the former is only nominally 
 
 1. From 1996 through 2000, 61 percent of U.S.-controlled corporations 
reported no U.S. tax liability. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. 
GAO-04-358, COMPARISON OF THE REPORTED TAX LIABILITIES OF FOREIGN- 
AND U.S.-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, 19962000 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04358.pdf. Seventy-one percent of U.S.-
controlled foreign corporations also reported no U.S. tax liability. Id. 
 2. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TREASURY DEPT, TREASURY DEPARTMENT 
GROSS TAX COLLECTIONS: AMOUNT COLLECTED BY QUARTER AND FISCAL 
YEAR, 19872004 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ 
04tc18fy.xls; see also ROBERT S. MCINTYRE & T.D. COO NGUYEN, CORPORATE 
INCOME TAXES IN THE BUSH YEARS 13 (2004), available at 
http://www.ctj.org/corpfed04an.pdf; David Cay Johnston, Tax Inquiries Fall as 
Cheating Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2003, at A16. 
 3. See Merle Erickson, How Much Are Nonexistent Earnings Worth?, 
CAPITAL IDEAS, Spring 2003, http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/news/capideas/ 
spring03/nonexistentearnings.html (discussing willingness of corporate man-
agers to pay additional taxes in furtherance of fraudulent earnings inflation). 
 4. See infra note 23. 
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penalized under current rules.5 This Article argues that be-
cause of the potentially corrosive effect that false reporting has 
on the tax system, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) should 
remedy the deficiency of current rules by revisiting principles 
of equity to deny refunds of taxes paid on fraudulently inflated 
income. 
Since the implosion of Enron in November of 2001, Wall 
Street has been severely shaken by an unprecedented string of 
accounting fraud scandals involving publicly traded corpora-
tions.6 Most of the corporations involved have been guilty of 
earnings inflationadding fictitious income to their financial 
statements. The appeal of earnings inflation is obvious. By 
means of various accounting gimmicks, or by simply manufac-
turing transactions that never took place, a company can create 
a steadily rising earnings curve that will boost its share price.7 
Not surprisingly, this produces lucrative rewards for manage-
ment. Stock option grants to management frequently are tied to 
specified earnings targets that may be achieved more quickly 
by manipulating the companys books.8 Moreover, as share 
prices rise based on increases in revenue and profit, manage-
ment may realize ever-greater gains from sales of previously 
acquired shares of the company.9 
 
 5.  See infra Part II.C. 
 6. More than fifty major publicly traded corporations were under inves-
tigation for accounting fraud and other financial misdeeds in 2002 alone. See 
Gary Stoller, Funny Numbers, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 2002, at B3. 
 7. See David Millon, Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quar-
terly Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
890, 89299 (2002) (discussing investor willingness to pay a predictability 
premium for the shares of companies reporting continuous earnings increases 
and the resulting single-minded focus on boosting stock prices through short-
term earnings performance [that] has become standard operating procedure at 
most . . . publicly traded corporations). 
 8. See id. at 906 (A . . . likely explanation for [share price maximization] 
looks . . . to managements own self-interest . . . . It is now widely assumed 
that executives current obsession with quarterly earnings and their effect on 
stock prices is connected to the dramatic increase in compensation by means of 
stock options.). 
 9. For example, from 1999 to 2001, Qwest Communications executives 
reaped more than $500 million from stock sales while shares were trading in 
the $40 range. David Leonhardt, Qwest Leaders Made Millions in Stock Sales, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at C1. Of that amount, $227 million was made by 
one former CEO alone. Id. By mid-2002, however, Qwest had confessed to in-
flating earnings and its stock was trading at less than $1.50 per share. Id. 
Similarly, HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy exercised more than $201 mil-
lion in stock options in the six years that the company inflated its earnings. 
Closing Arguments Wind Up at Scrushy Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2005, at 
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But as the accounting scandals have unraveled, dozens of 
public companies have been forced to restate their earnings, 
and in some cases file for bankruptcy protection.10 Congress re-
sponded to these financial accounting abuses by passing the 
sweeping Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,11 which was intended to 
strengthen the oversight of accountants, increase corporate re-
sponsibility, and enhance the ability of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) to detect and investigate accounting 
fraud.12 However, a company deceiving shareholders about its 
earnings generally must deceive the tax collector as well as the 
securities regulator. 
Although they are not compelled to do so, corporations that 
inflate their earnings often pay tax on the fictitious income 
they create because doing so helps to hide the accounting fraud 
from investors, analysts and the SEC.13 If the fraud goes unde-
tected, an offending corporation almost certainly will be content 
to allow the government to keep the tax overpayments.14 When 
the fraud is exposed, however, the corporation is likely to re-
spond by seeking a refund of the overpaid taxes, which may 
amount to tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars.15 World-
 
C3. 
 10. See James Toedtman, Scandal Scorecard, NEWSDAY, July 13, 2004, 
http://www.newsday.com/business/ny-scandal-scorecard%2C0%2C4119732 
.story?coll=ny-business-utility. 
 11. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 12. See H.R. Rep. No. 107-610 passim (2002) (Conf. Rep.). In addition to 
the congressional response, the SECcharged with protecting investors and 
maintaining the integrity of the securities marketsstepped up enforcement 
activity, seeking criminal penalties against dozens of officers and employees of 
offending companies, imposing penalties totaling roughly $1.48 billion, and 
ordering disgorgement of approximately $3.77 billion in ill-gotten gains in fis-
cal years 1999 through 2003. SEC ANN. REP. 15 (2003), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/ar03full.pdf; SEC ANN. REP. 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep02/ar02full.pdf; SEC ANN. REP. 1 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep01/ar01full.pdf; SEC ANN. REP. 1 (2000), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep00/ar00full.pdf; SEC ANN. REP. 1 
(1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep99/ar99full.pdf. Of the pen-
alties imposed during those five years, over $1 billion was levied in fiscal year 
2003 alone. SEC ANN. REP. 15 (2003). 
 13. See Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Wins Senate Ap-
proval of Corporate Crackdown Measure (May 15, 2003), http://grassley 
.senate.gov/index.cfm (search for Corporate Crackdown; then follow the re-
sulting hyperlink) (The con men pay a little tax to help hide their fraud, 
bump up the price and cash in their stock options.). 
 14. See Erickson, supra note 3. 
 15. See Rebecca Blumenstein et al., After Inflating Their Income, Compa-
nies Want IRS Refunds, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2003, at A1; Anitha Reddy & 
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Com,16 for example, which created $11 billion in phony income 
through various accounting schemes,17 reportedly already has 
collected nearly $300 million in tax refunds.18 Qwest Communi-
cations International Inc., HealthSouth and Enron also report-
edly considered or are considering filing refund claims for over-
payments of income tax in similar circumstances.19 Information 
on refund claims is difficult to obtain owing to the confidential-
ity of federal income tax returns,20 but given the breadth of the 
earnings-inflation problem there are likely dozens of other cor-
porations seeking refunds as a result of fraudulently overstated 
income. 
Perhaps such claims are appropriate. After all, a corpora-
tion that inflates its taxable income clearly pays more federal 
income tax than it owes.21 Importantly for the company, a re-
fund of the tax paid also provides an infusion of cash that may 
be used to mitigate the damage to creditors or shareholders 
caused by the underlying accounting fraud.22 Of course, if a tax 
refund were permitted in these circumstances, the tax rules 
should at least exact a hefty penalty in order to deter future 
 
Christopher Stern, Firms Want Refunds of Tax on Fake Profit, WASH. POST, 
May 3, 2003, at E1. 
 16. In connection with its emergence from bankruptcy, WorldCom 
changed its brand name to MCI. Press Release, WorldCom, Inc., WorldCom 
Files Plan of Reorganization and Changes Brand Name to MCI (Apr. 14, 
2003), http://global.mci.com/about/news/releases/2003/ (follow the correspond-
ing hyperlink under 14 April, 2003). 
 17. Shawn Young, MCI to State Fraud Was $11 Billion, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
12, 2004, at A3. 
 18. See Blumenstein et al., supra note 15. The $300 million reportedly col-
lected by WorldCom is nearly as much as the total amount paid in federal tax 
refunds to all corporations in the State of Oregon in 2003. See INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., TREASURY DEPT, PUBLN NO. 55B, INTERNAL REVENUE SER-
VICE 2003 DATA BOOK 15 tbl.8, available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/ 
pub/irs-soi/03db08rf.xls. 
 19. See Blumenstein et al., supra note 15. Enron reportedly paid no in-
come tax in four of the five years from 1996 through 2000. See David Cay 
Johnston, Enron Avoided Income Taxes in 4 of 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 
2002, at A1; CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, LESS THAN ZERO: ENRONS CORPO-
RATE TAX PAYMENTS 19962000 1 (2002), http://www.ctj.org/pdf/enron.pdf. 
 20. The Internal Revenue Code prohibits officers and employees of the 
United States from disclosing any return or return information. I.R.C.  
§ 6103(a) (2000). Return information is defined as any tax or information re-
turn . . . or claim for refund (emphasis added). Id. § 6103(b). 
 21. HealthSouth spokesman Andy Brimmer noted, Logically, if we over-
paid taxes on income we didnt have, we may seek a refund. Blumenstein et 
al., supra note 15. 
 22. But see infra Part III.D.2 for a discussion of the innocent investor. 
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use of the tax system to conceal accounting fraud. Unfortu-
nately, the rules do no such thing. Because the relevant penalty 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code apply to underpay-
ments rather than overpayments of income tax, a corporation 
guilty of this kind of fraud might pay no more than a few thou-
sand dollars in fines. One way to more adequately penalize the 
tax fraud committed in earnings-inflation cases would be to 
withhold the related tax refund.23 
 
 23. At this point it may be helpful to clarify a critical point regarding ter-
minology. Can a taxpayer commit tax fraud by paying too much tax to the 
Treasury? As it turns out, the answer is that it is indeed possible, for several 
reasons. First, in simplest terms, fraud means deception. See Frowen v. Blank, 
425 A.2d 412, 415 (Pa. 1981) (A fraud consists in anything calculated to de-
ceive, whether by single act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or a 
suggestion of what is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, 
by speech or silence, word of mouth, or look or gesture.); BLACKS LAW DIC-
TIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that fraud is synonymous with bad faith, 
dishonesty, infidelity, faithlessness, perfidy, and unfairness). Tax fraud is 
therefore deception with respect to ones tax liability. This is the sense in 
which the term is used in I.R.C. § 7206(1), which is under the title Fraud and 
False Statements and simply prohibits the willful filing of a false tax return. 
I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000). No monetary loss to the government or underpayment 
of tax is necessary for a conviction under this statute. See infra note 94 and 
accompanying text. 
Second, fraud commonly is understood to mean deception resulting in loss 
to another. See Gibbons v. Brandt, 170 F.2d 385, 391 (7th Cir. 1947) (Fraud in 
its generic sense, especially as the word is used in courts of equity, comprises 
all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable 
duty and resulting in damage to another.) (emphasis added); BLACKS LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra, at 660 (defining fraud to also include perversion of truth 
causing one to part with some valuable thing). However, the loss involved 
need not be monetary. It may consist of the surrender of a legal right, the in-
fliction of a legal injury or some form of detrimental reliance resulting in dam-
age. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 660. Thus, as will be shown, a 
violation of § 7206(1) is also fraud under this more limited definition of the 
term. See infra notes 10621 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
detriment to the U.S. government caused by a violation of § 7206(1). 
Third, § 7206(1) and the crime most frequently associated with the notion 
of tax fraudtax evasion under I.R.C. § 7201were originally part of the 
same statute. I.R.C. § 7201 (2000). The Income Tax Law of 1913 stated that 
one who makes any false or fraudulent return . . . with intent to defeat or 
evade the assessment required by this section . . . shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(F), 38 Stat. 114, 171 (1913) (emphasis added). 
This unitary provision was bifurcated in the War Revenue Act of 1917 (with-
out any explanation in the legislative history), resulting in one provision pro-
scribing the making of a false or fraudulent return (the predecessor to  
§ 7206(1)) and the other proscribing the evasion or attempted evasion of tax 
(the predecessor to § 7201). See War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1209, 
40 Stat. 300, 336 (1917). Thus, it is reasonable to refer to the activity currently 
prohibited under § 7206(1) in its present form as tax fraud and to the activ-
ity prohibited under § 7201 as tax evasion. For additional detail on the evo-
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Recognizing that companies that inflate their taxable in-
come make the IRS an unwitting accomplice to . . . fraud,24 
the Senate, in May 2003, approved a measure that would have 
increased the penalty for tax fraud to an amount equal to the 
overpayment of tax attributable to the fraud.25 The effect of this 
provision would have been to disallow any refunds of taxes paid 
on fraudulently inflated income.26 Unfortunately, the measure 
was dropped in the conference committee27 and did not become 
part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ultimately 
signed by President George W. Bush in October 2004.28 How-
ever, this Article suggests that the IRS may be able to achieve 
the results intended by the omitted Senate provision through 
 
lution of §§ 7201 and 7206(1), see Ronald H. Jensen, Reflections on United 
States v. Leona Helmsely: Should Impossibility Be a Defense to Attempted 
Income Tax Evasion?, 12 VA. TAX REV. 335, 34648 (1993). 
Finally, violations of § 7206(1) are described by the IRS as Fraudulent 
Activities and are investigated and prosecuted by the IRS Criminal Investiga-
tion Divisions General Tax Fraud Program. See Internal Revenue Service 
Criminal Investigation, General Tax Fraud Program, http://www.ustreas.gov/ 
irs/ci/tax_fraud/docgeneraltaxfraud.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2005). 
 24. Press Release, supra note 13. 
 25. S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 425 (2004); see Rob Wells, Tax Plan Takes 
Shape: Lawmakers Move to Halt Refunds on False Earnings, WALL ST. J., May 
16, 2003, at A2. 
 26. The bill would have amended § 7206 to provide: 
If any portion of any underpayment (as defined in section 6664(a)) or 
overpayment (as defined in section 6401(a)) of tax required to be 
shown on a return is attributable to fraudulent action described in 
subsection (a), the applicable [penalty] under subsection (a) shall in 
no event be less than an amount equal to such portion. 
S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 425 (as passed by Senate, May 11, 2004) (emphasis 
added). The provision subsequently was made an amendment to the Jump-
start Our Business Strength (JOBS) Act, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 425 (en-
grossed amendment as agreed to by Senate, July 15, 2004). Had it been 
adopted, the efficacy of the provision as worded is somewhat doubtful because 
§ 6401 does not define the term overpayment. I.R.C. § 6401 (2000). It merely 
states that an overpayment includes amounts assessed or collected from the 
taxpayer after the expiration of the statute of limitations for such assessment 
or collection. Id. 
 27. Although the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
357, 118 Stat. 1418, includes some provisions aimed at curbing corporate tax 
shelters and corporate tax avoidance in general, many more such provisions 
were dropped. Compare S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 425 (as reported in Senate, 
Nov. 7, 2003) with H.R. 4520, 108th Cong., §§ 811822 (as passed by House, 
Oct. 7, 2004, and Senate, Oct. 11, 2004). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. The measure resurfaced in a 
highway funding bill passed by the Senate on May 17, 2005, but was again 
dropped in final legislation. Compare H.R. 3, 109th Cong. § 5503 (as passed by 
Senate, May 17, 2005) with Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transporta-
tion Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-059 (2005). 
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the rules of equity.29 Moreover, equity may well furnish a more 
sound approach to penalizing offenders in such cases than 
would a legislative enactment.30 
Central to the thesis of this Article is the fact that tax-
refund suits are in essence claims in equity, a proposition that 
has two important implications. First, the taxpayer filing a tax-
refund suit is asking the court to impose a fair, just, and equi-
table remedynamely, the refund of taxes paid in excess of 
what was due. As an equity claimant, the taxpayer is not in a 
position to demand that the refund be granted.31 Second, the 
fact that refund suits are actions in equity means that claim-
ants are subject to well-established equitable defenses like the 
doctrine of unclean hands.32 Based on these twin propositions, 
this Article asserts that the IRS not only may, but should, as-
sert equitable defenses to deny refunds of taxes paid on fraudu-
lently inflated earnings. 
Part I of the Article begins with an examination of how a 
company actually inflates its earnings based on the example of 
prominent offender WorldCom, and then addresses the rela-
tionship between accounting, or book, income and tax income. 
This part of the Article also assesses the breadth of the earn-
ings-inflation problem and analyzes the potential harm that in-
flation of taxable income may inflict on the federal tax system. 
Part II examines the current criminal and civil provisions of 
the Internal Revenue Code that govern tax fraud related to 
earnings inflation and discusses the elements of those offenses. 
The element of materiality is particularly critical because it 
 
 29. See generally Craig M. Boise, Tax Fraud and Inflated Corporate Earn-
ings: Is There an Alternative to the Legislative Fix?, 106 TAX NOTES 191 (2005). 
Although the Senate legislation failed to receive the support of the full Con-
gress, this does not suggest that the courts may not, or should not, attempt to 
achieve the results contemplated by that legislation within the sphere of their 
jurisdiction, particularly when doing so is consistent with what one scholar 
has termed the theoretical construct that overarches the sum total of the en-
tire Internal Revenue Code and is intended to be captured by it. Deborah A. 
Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492, 
497 (1995). 
 30. See infra Part III.D. 
 31. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: 
The Michigan Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 609, 614 (1997) ([P]arties 
who have placed their case within the category of cases traditionally qualify-
ing for equitable relief were not automatically entitled to it. Parties could not 
demand equitable relief; to the contrary, they always requested it.). 
 32. The doctrine of unclean hands derives from the general equitable ad-
monition that those who seek equity must themselves do equity. See G.W. 
KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 87117 (6th ed. 1965). 
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addresses the question of whether overstating income for tax 
purposes (as opposed to understating it) causes any cognizable 
harm to the government that ought to be penalized. This por-
tion of the Article concludes that the government is harmed by 
tax fraud, that the penalty provisions for the offense generally 
are not sufficiently robust, and that they are particularly in-
adequate in dealing with earnings inflation. It also describes 
the tax-refund process and the relative ease with which compa-
nies may obtain refunds, even where the excess taxes were paid 
to mask fraudulent earnings. Part II closes with the observa-
tion that a company is entitled to receive interest on overpay-
ments of tax, which further rewards use of the tax system to 
disguise accounting fraud. 
Part III of the Article explores the relationship between 
fraud-related refund claims and equity. To provide support for 
the application of equity as proposed in Part IV of the Article, 
Part III first reviews the history of equity and its relationship 
to tax-refund suits to establish that equity is an appropriate 
vehicle for evaluating tax-refund claims. It then discusses the 
various equitable defenses that apply in equity cases, how 
those defenses might be asserted by the IRS against a tax-
refund claim like WorldComs, and the related public policy im-
plications of asserting such defenses. Finally, Part IV of the Ar-
ticle discusses how, as a matter of process, the IRS may use a 
recent change to a corporate income tax return schedule to 
identify fraud-related refund claims and how the congressional 
Joint Committee on Taxation might utilize its powers to review 
large refund claims. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF EARNINGS INFLATION  
A. FINANCIAL REPORTING 
WorldCom is a stunning example of an apparently healthy 
company secretly manipulating its books to create nonexistent 
earnings and thus increase its stock price.33 In August of 1998, 
 
 33. A trade group of CEOs convened a commission to analyze the corpo-
rate scandals of the past several years and the subsequent decline of public 
and investor trust in the capital markets. THE CONFERENCE BD. COMMN ON 
PUB. TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2002), 
available at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/SR-03-04.pdf. The com-
mission concluded that attempts by corporate managers to manipulate com-
pany stock price were largely attributable to excessive use of stock options and 
other forms of equity-based incentive compensation. Id. at 56. 
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WorldCom appeared phenomenally successful. In that month, 
the company completed a $6.1 billion bond offering, the largest 
corporate bond issue in history.34 The funds it raised helped to 
pay for its acquisition of MCI earlier that year.35 Through a 
string of more than seventy acquisitions, capped by the MCI 
merger, a company that had begun as a humble reseller of long-
distance telephone services for hotels in Mississippi36 had 
grown to become the nations second-largest long-distance 
provider with some twenty million residential customers and 
thousands of corporate accounts.37 WorldComs extensive global 
network facilities covered six continents and reached every ma-
jor city in the world through more than 90,000 miles of land-
based and undersea fiber-optic cable.38 Virtually every major 
investor felt the need to have WorldCom in its portfolio and 
there was an expectation in some quarters that the companys 
mega-bond deal would lift the entire corporate bond market.39 
But WorldComs apparent success masked grave financial 
troubles that mounted in the next few years. The explosive 
growth that had driven the companys extraordinary earnings 
trajectory had come with a high price tag. By 2002, the com-
pany had accumulated over $40 billion in debt,40 which it 
struggled to service as a general downturn in the telecommuni-
cations industry reduced revenue and produced a $2 trillion 
loss in the value of telecommunications stocks.41 Moreover, poor 
management of companies that WorldCom acquired meant that  
 
 
 
 34. Gregory Zuckerman, WorldCom Makes History with $6.1 Billion Sale 
of Eagerly Awaited, Strongly Demanded Bonds, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1998, at 
C15. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See First Interim Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Ex-
aminer at 1113, In re Worldcom, Inc., No. 02-15533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 
2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/ 
thornburgh1strpt.pdf [hereinafter WorldCom First Report]. 
 37. See Shawn Young et al., WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., 
July 22, 2002, at A3. 
 38. Indictment at 23, United States v. Ebbers, Case No. S3 02 Cr. 1144 
(BSJ) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2004). 
 39. Zuckerman, supra note 34. 
 40. RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. 
RAKOFF 20 (2003), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rulings/ 
02cv4963_082603.pdf. 
 41. See Simon Romero & Jonathan D. Glater, Bankruptcys Taut Wiring, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at A1. 
BOISE_3FMT 11/22/2005 04:30:44 PM 
154 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:144 
 
anticipated efficiencies were not realized, and, as a result, the 
companys overhead costs soared.42 
A large part of WorldComs overhead consisted of costs as-
sociated with transmitting voice or data over communication 
lines. These costs are known in the telecommunications indus-
try as line costs. WorldCom accounted for its line costs by 
creating reserves on its books reflecting anticipated payments, 
and then releasing those reserves as bills were paid.43 An indi-
vidual might do much the same thing by making an entry in 
her check register for an electric bill that has not yet been paid, 
thus reducing her checkbook balance by the amount of the bill. 
Ultimately, the entry is reconciled when the check is written to 
the utility company. 
As its financial difficulties increased, WorldCom began to 
boost its reported earnings by releasing its accrued line cost re-
serves before the line costs were paid, a move that violated 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).44 This prac-
tice would be similar to the individual deleting the checkbook 
entry for her electric bill. Although the account balance re-
flected in the check register increases, the expense is still owed 
and the register thus does not accurately reflect the individ-
uals financial position. By April 2001, WorldCom had released 
all of its line cost reserves to shore up its earnings and a new 
strategy was needed to boost revenue.45 It found such a strat-
egy in altering the way it accounted for those same line costs. 
Beginning in 2001, rather than continuing to treat line 
costs as an expense that reduced its ever-dwindling income, 
WorldCom began to capitalize those costs because the cost of 
 
 42. BREEDEN, supra note 40, at 20. 
 43. See WorldCom First Report, supra note 36, at 10607. 
 44. DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 2, 6162 
(2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/ 
000093176303001862/dex991.htm. Manipulation of reserves represents the 
most common approach to earnings management. See Mark W. Nelson et al., 
How Are Earnings Managed? Examples from Auditors, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 
(SUPPLEMENT) 17, 2223 (2003), (discussing an empirical study, which found 
that 38 percent of attempts by companies to manage earnings involved reserve 
transactions). 
 45. On a quarterly basis, WorldCom assessed the gap between actual and 
target revenue, and then closed the gap through the use of various accounting 
opportunities identified by the accounting groups. Third and Final Interim 
Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Examiner at 276, In re World-
com, Inc., No. 02-15533 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.kl.com/files/tbl_s48News/PDFUpload307/10129/WorldCom_ 
Report_final.pdf [hereinafter WorldCom Third Report]. 
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capitalized items can be spread out over many years, thus re-
ducing the immediate impact of the expense on income.46 One 
commentator has likened this direct violation of GAAP to the 
manager of an ice cream parlor pretending that operating ex-
penses for things such as cream, sugar and chocolate syrup 
really are part of the purchase price of a new refrigerator.47 
Because capitalization made its line costs much lower, World-
Coms income increased by almost $4 billion in the next two 
years, insuring that the company would meet analysts profit 
expectations and continue to experience surging share prices.48 
This artificial income, along with another $2 billion or so in 
false revenue entries and various improper accounting adjust-
ments,49 helped prop up WorldCom through July 2002, when 
the teetering edifice finally and spectacularly collapsed in 
bankruptcy.50 
B. TAX REPORTING 
When WorldCom inflated the book income it reported to 
shareholders in 1999 through the tactics just described, it cre-
ated another problemone that was tax-related. To illustrate, 
assume for a moment that WorldCom was guilty only of im-
properly capitalizing line costs in 2001 (i.e., treating the ice 
cream expenses as the cost of a refrigerator). By capitalizing 
line costs rather than deducting them from income, WorldCom 
reduced its expenses for 2001 by roughly $2.1 billion and thus 
increased its income for that year by the same amount.51 As-
suming for purposes of illustration that WorldCom had no 
other earnings, the company could then have reported $2.1 bil-
lion of book income for 2001. If the companys reported income 
 
 46. Id. at 278. 
 47. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE GREAT UNRAVELING 114 (2003). 
 48. See WorldCom First Report, supra note 36, at 109 (describing the 
manner in which WorldCom overstated its pre-tax income). 
 49. WorldCom was perpetrating accounting fraud in a number of ways 
other than the methods described in this Article. See id. at 11017. 
 50. When its fraud became public, WorldComs creditors declared the 
company in default on various loan commitments. See Jared Sandberg et al., 
WorldCom to File Chapter 11, as Cash Reserves Dwindle Fast, WALL ST. J., 
July 19, 2002, at A1. As its sources of funding dried up, WorldCom ran out of 
cash and was forced to file for bankruptcy protection. Id. As a result of World-
Coms bankruptcy, over $200 billion in shareholder value was destroyed and 
tens of thousands of WorldCom employees lost their jobs. See BREEDEN, supra 
note 40, at 12 & n.1. 
 51. WorldCom Third Report, supra note 45, at 35253. 
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met or exceeded analysts expectations, the company likely 
would see a boost in its stock price, thus accomplishing one of 
managements principal goals. The difficult question, however, 
was how the company should treat that $2.1 billion of phony 
book income for federal income tax purposes. 
WorldCom had at least two choices. First, the company 
simply could have omitted the phantom income from its 2001 
tax return. Had it done so, WorldComs taxable income would 
have been $0 and the company would have paid no federal in-
come tax.52 However, this would have created a $2.1 billion gap 
between WorldComs reported book income ($2.1 billion) on the 
one hand, and its taxable income ($0), on the other.53 World-
Com would have had to reconcile this book-tax difference on 
Schedule M-1 of its federal income tax return.54 Given the size 
of the gap, the IRS might well have been alerted to WorldComs 
accounting fraud.55 Further, to analysts who closely followed 
the company, such a sizeable book-tax difference might have 
suggested that WorldCom either was managing its earnings56 
 
 52. Under GAAP, WorldCom would have been required to record an addi-
tional deferred tax expense equal to the tax on $2.1 billion to account for the 
expectation that income taxes ultimately would be paid on the reported book 
income. Assuming a hypothetical effective tax rate of 20 percent, this would 
have produced a deferred tax expense of $420 million. Some studies have indi-
cated that there is a negative association between deferred taxes (represented 
by the book-tax gap) and a companys share returns. See, e.g., Paul K. Chaney 
& Debra Jeter, The Effect of Deferred Taxes on Security Prices, 9 J. ACCT. AU-
DITING & FIN. 91, 114 (1994); Lillian F. Mills & Kaye J. Newberry, The Influ-
ence of Tax and Non-Tax Costs on Book-Tax Reporting Differences: Public and 
Private Firms, 23 J. AM. TAXN ASSN 1, 1 (2001). 
 53. In reality, failing to report the artificial income would have increased, 
rather than created, a book-tax difference since WorldCom, like most compa-
nies, already would have had a book-tax difference. This difference occurs be-
cause income is calculated differently for financial accounting purposes than 
for federal income tax purposes. See generally George A. Plesko, Corporate Tax 
Avoidance and the Properties of Corporate Earnings, 57 NATL TAX J. 729 
(2004) (describing the differences between the rules used to compute income 
for financial and tax-reporting purposes). 
 54. In a variation on this approach, WorldCom could have shifted the arti-
ficial income to an offshore subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction, thus making 
the book-tax difference permanent and avoiding the recognition of the deferred 
tax liability described supra, note 52. See ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME TAXES
SPECIAL AREAS, Opinion No. 23 (Accounting Principles Bd. 1972). 
 55. There is evidence that sizeable book-tax differences may attract IRS 
scrutiny. See Lillian F. Mills, Book-Tax Differences and Internal Revenue Ser-
vice Adjustments, 36 J. ACCT. RES. 343, 345 (1998). 
 56. Management of earnings occurs when managers use judgment in fi-
nancial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to 
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance 
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or had low earnings quality.57 Intensified IRS scrutiny or a 
market perception of earnings irregularities would have been 
equally disastrous to a company that was concealing billions of 
dollars of artificial income in the midst of an industry down-
turn, and these considerations may have resulted in World-
Coms decision to report the phantom income. 
Alternatively, WorldCom could have elected to report the 
$2.1 billion of phantom book earnings as taxable income on its 
income tax return. Because the fictitious book income ($2.1 bil-
lion) would match taxable income ($2.1 billion), this approach 
would produce no book-tax difference to be reconciled on 
Schedule M-1, thus greatly reducing the likelihood that World-
Coms earnings inflation would be discovered.58 Of course, the 
drawback would be the cash outlay necessary to pay taxes on 
the income.59 Again, assuming WorldCom had no other earn-
ings and was subject to a hypothetical effective tax rate of five 
percent, the company would incur a tax liability of $105 million 
on the phantom income.60 
 
of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers. Paul M. Healy & James M. Wahlen, A Review of the 
Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting, 
13 ACCT. HORIZONS 365, 368 (1999). 
 57. Earnings quality refers to the level of sustainability of a companys 
earnings. See Scott A. Richardson, Earnings Quality and Short Sellers, 17 
ACCT. HORIZONS (SUPPLEMENT) 49, 49 (2003). Low-quality earnings could re-
sult from overvaluation of receivables, aggressive manipulation of reserves, or 
inappropriate valuation of inventory, and are characterized by an increase in 
current earnings without any corresponding increase in cash flows. Id. 
 58. WorldCom actually had a third alternative. It could have reported its 
inflated earnings as additional gross income and then fabricated correspond-
ing deductions to reduce or eliminate its taxable income. The result would 
have been earnings inflation with no tax cost. However, creating $300 million 
worth of phony deductions would have exposed the company to significant au-
dit risk. 
 59. Responding to reports that Enron paid no federal income tax from 
1996 through 2000, one scholar has noted that despite the inflated earnings on 
its income statement, the company did not have any real income on which to 
pay tax. See Victor Fleischer, Enrons Dirty Little Secret: Waiting for the Other 
Shoe to Drop, 94 TAX NOTES 1045, 1045 (2002). The lack of real income, how-
ever, was no impediment to paying income tax in other cases, such as that of 
WorldCom. 
 60. Although the largest corporations pay tax at a maximum marginal 
rate of 35 percent, in 2000, an estimated 94 percent of U.S. corporations filing 
tax returns reported paying taxes of less than 5 percent of their income. See 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2. WorldCom probably could 
have utilized net operating loss (NOL) carryforwards or carrybacks to offset 
at least some of the phantom taxable income and thus further reduce its tax 
liability. In such circumstances, WorldCom would not be entitled to a refund, 
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Of these two alternatives, WorldCom evidently chose the 
latter, electing to report some or all of the fraudulent book in-
come it created on its federal income tax returns and pay the 
resulting income tax.61 WorldComs situation illustrates the 
impact that earnings inflation in a companys financial ac-
counts has on its tax accounting. A company that inflates earn-
ings must either falsify its federal income tax return and pay 
tax on phantom income or face a significant risk that its earn-
ings fraud will be detected. Thus, for many companies that in-
flate book income, tax fraud becomes a necessary component of 
the accounting fraud. 
C. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
Unfortunately, WorldCom is not alone in engaging in 
fraudulent earnings inflation.62 The problem is significant and 
has grown in recent years, creating a corresponding threat to 
the integrity of corporate income tax reporting in the eyes of 
the public and other corporations alike. A 1999 study released 
by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
 
but might seek to reinstate the NOLs. Any attempt to reinstate NOLs should, 
like refund claims, be subject to the equitable defenses discussed in this Arti-
cle. 
 61. According to a recent study of firms that overstated accounting income 
and paid additional taxes as a result, the median firm was willing to pay an 
additional eight cents in income tax for each dollar of inflated pre-tax earn-
ings. See Merle Erickson et al., How Much Will Firms Pay for Earnings That 
Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings, 79 
ACCT. REV. 387, 387 (2004). 
 62. Other companies that have restated previously inflated earnings in-
clude: Bristol-Myers Squibb ($2.5 billion from 1999 to 2002), Computer Asso-
ciates ($1 billion), Enron ($1.2 billion in 2000), HealthSouth ($2.5 billion since 
1986), Qwest Communications International ($144 million in 2000 and 2001), 
Rite Aid Corporation ($1.6 billion), and Xerox ($6.4 billion from 1997 to 2001). 
See Toedtman, supra note 10. AOL Time Warner also overstated its earnings 
by $500 million from 2000 through 2002. See Julia Angwin, SEC Fines Time 
Warner $300 Million, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2005, at A3. Earnings manipula-
tion has not been limited to U.S. corporations. Dutch food retailer, Ahold NV, 
has acknowledged that it exaggerated earnings by $1.08 billion from 2000 to 
2002 (although Aholds U.S. subsidiary, U.S. Foodservice, accounted for $856 
million of the overstatement). Aholds Estimate of Restatement Is Raised 
Again, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2003, at B7; Deborah Ball, Ahold Chairman Plans 
to Resign Amid Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2003, at B4. Likewise, in It-
aly, international dairy giant Parmalat SpA, reportedly inflated its earnings 
by more than $1 billion and attempted to hide more than $8 billion in debt. 
Alessandra Galloni et al., Scope of Scandal at Parmalat Widens to More Than 
$8 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2003, at A1. 
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Commission (COSO)63 assessed the extent of corporate finan-
cial statement fraud for the eleven-year period from 1987 
through 1997.64 The commissioned study examined hundreds of 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) is-
sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in or-
der to identify specific instances of financial statement fraud.65 
Only those AAERs that reflected a violation of the SEC rules 
most directly related to financial fraud were included in the 
studys sample.66 The study found that from 1987 through 
1997, nearly 300 companies were involved in financial state-
ment fraud.67 Of the 200 companies randomly selected from 
this group for closer examination, all were publicly traded, but 
they tended to be relatively small (less than $100 million in to-
tal assets).68 Only 22 percent of the companies were listed on 
the New York or American Stock Exchanges.69 
The number of companies inflating earnings rose dramati-
cally after 1997, according to a 2002 General Accounting Office 
(GAO) study.70 To identify earnings inflation, the GAO Study 
examined financial statement restatements announced by pub-
licly traded companies during the period from 1997 through 
June, 2002. The study was limited to restatements arising from 
accounting irregularities, or situations in which a company 
initially had not fairly presented its financial statements in ac-
 
 63. COSO is a private sector initiative, jointly sponsored and funded by 
the American Accounting Association, the American Institute of Certified Pub-
lic Accountants, the Financial Executives Institute, the Institute of Manage-
ment Accountants, and the Institute of Internal Auditors. COSO Home Page, 
http://www.coso.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2005). 
 64. MARK S. BEASLEY ET AL., COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE 
TREADWAY COMMN, FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 19871997: AN 
ANALYSIS OF U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES 4 (1999), available at http://www.coso 
.org/publications/FFR_1987_1997.pdf. 
 65. BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 64, at 4. An AAER contains a summary of 
enforcement action taken against a public company by the SEC. Id. 
 66. Specifically, the study focused on violations of Rule 10(b)-5, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2005) (promulgated by the SEC under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000)), and section 17(a) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2000). BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 64, at 
4. 
 67. BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 64, at 4. 
 68. Id. at 5. 
 69. Id. 
 70. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-03-138, FINANCIAL 
STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS 4 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new 
.items/d03138.pdf. 
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cordance with GAAP.71 The growth in the number of earnings 
restatements during the period studied was remarkable. 
Whereas the COSO Study found 300 incidents of financial 
statement fraud in the eleven-year period it covered, the GAO 
Study found that 225 companies restated earnings because of 
accounting irregularities in 2001 alone, with 250 more company 
restatements projected for 2002.72 Between 1997 and June, 
2002, the number of companies restating earnings grew by 145 
percent, with that growth expected to increase to 170 percent 
by the end of 2002.73 In other words, during the five-year period 
studied, roughly 10 percent of all listed companies announced a 
restatement of earnings arising from accounting irregularities, 
most of which involved the sort of fraud committed by World-
Com.74 
As the incidence of earnings restatements increased, the 
profile of companies restating earnings also shifted. According 
to the GAO Study, large company restatements rose signifi-
cantly after 1997.75 The median market capitalization of a re-
stating company rose from $500 million in 1997 to over $2 bil-
lion in 2002. Moreover, of the 125 public companies that 
restated earnings because of accounting irregularities in 2002, 
107 (over 85 percent) were listed on either the New York Stock 
Exchange or NASDAQmarkets that are home to the largest 
corporations.76 
 
 71. Id. at 2. Over half of the accounting irregularities resulted from im-
proper revenue recognition or cost or expense related issues. Id. at 2021. 
Creating fictitious income would fall within the former category, while World-
Coms improper capitalization of line costs would fall within the latter cate-
gory. Id. at 1920. 
 72. As of this writing, the GAO has not updated its study for periods after 
June, 2002. A more recent study by the Huron Consulting Group indicates 
that between the years 2000 and 2004 overall financial statement restate-
ments nearly doubled, increasing from 233 to 414. HURON CONSULTING 
GROUP, 2004 ANNUAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL REPORTING MATTERS 4 (2005), 
available at http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/uploadedFiles/Huron_ 
2004_Review%20of%20Financial%20Reporting%20Matters.pdf. 
 73. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 4. 
 74. Id. 
 75. For purposes of the study, a large company was one with a market 
capitalization of over $10 billion. Id. at 4 n.6. The study obtained similar re-
sults where a large company was defined as one having over $1 billion in as-
sets. Id. 
 76. See National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ), NASDAQ National Market Securities, http://www.nasdaq.com/ 
asp/symbols.asp?exchange=NNM (last visited Sept. 12, 2005); New York Stock 
Exchange, Listed Company Directory, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/ 
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In short, the COSO study and the GAO Study compellingly 
suggest that for at least the last eighteen years we have been in 
a period of significant corporate earnings restatements that 
have accelerated dramatically since 1997. In a large number of 
cases, those restatements correct for earnings inflated through 
fraudulent accounting activity by a group of companies that in-
cludes a rapidly growing percentage of large, publicly traded 
corporations. Although it is possible that corrective steps taken 
by the SEC and Congress to reduce fraudulent financial report-
ing77 may begin to reduce the incidence of earnings inflation, 
none of the available data suggest that this has occurred, and 
anecdotal evidence indicates that earnings inflation remains a 
problem.78 Moreover, the COSO study makes it clear that al-
though the number of cases has ballooned in the last few years, 
earnings inflation has been a persistent part of the corporate  
 
 
 
listed.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005). 
 77. See supra note 12. 
 78. Corporate earnings restatements reached a record high in 2004. See 
Diya Gullapalli, To Err Is Human, To Restate Financials, Divine, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 20, 2005, at C3 (noting the Huron Study reported a 28 percent increase in 
error-driven restatements to set the record in 2004). Unlike the COSO and 
GAO Studies, the Huron Study did not differentiate between restatements 
that were attributable to fraud and those that were not. See HURON CONSULT-
ING GROUP, supra note 72, at 3. However, it is not unreasonable to expect that, 
at the very least, a relatively constant percentage of all restatements will in-
volve the type of illegal activity identified in the COSO and GAO Studies. 
Thus, one could reasonably conclude that, given the large number of overall 
restatements, those involving irregularities of the sort identified in the COSO 
Study and the GAO Study also increased. Companies that recently admitted 
inflating their earnings under circumstances that indicate fraudulent activity 
include Fannie Mae, the giant mortgage-finance company, which was found to 
have overstated its earnings by some $9 billion during a period beginning in 
2001 and continuing through mid-2004, see James R. Hagerty et al., Fannie Is 
Directed to Restate Results After SEC Review, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2004, at 
A1; Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc., which overstated its net income by as 
much as 8 percent for fiscal year 2004, see Mark Maremont & Rick Brooks, 
Fresh Woes Batter Krispy Kreme, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2005, at A3; and Nortel 
Networks Corporation, which overstated its 2003 net income by almost $300 
million, see Mark Heinzl & Ken Brown, Nortel Unveils New Accounting Flubs, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at A3. Additionally, several restaurant operators, 
including Applebees International Inc., CKE Restaurants, Inc. (owner of the 
Hardees and Carls Jr. chains), Brinker International (operator of Chilis), and 
Darden Restaurants (operator of Red Lobster, Olive Garden and other chains), 
improperly understated lease expenses and thus inflated reported earnings. 
See Steven D. Jones & Richard Gibson, Restaurants Serve Up Restatements: 
More Scrutiny of Leases Is Leading Some Chains to Trim Their Past Profits, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2005, at C3. 
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financial reporting picture for over a decade and a half. Thus, it 
is likely that the concomitant tax fraud will persist for some 
time as well. 
II.  TAX FRAUD: PENALTIES AND REFUNDS 
For companies that engage in earnings inflation, falsify 
their tax returns to conceal the earnings inflation, and then get 
caught, there are consequences. The SEC imposes some meas-
ure of punishment for companies violation of securities law.79 
The IRS may also impose penalties for a companys violation of 
the tax law. This part of the Article discusses the severity of 
the penalties attached to tax fraud and then describes how 
readily a corporation may retrieve the taxes it paid based on a 
fraudulent tax return, receiving interest on the refund to boot. 
A. TAX FRAUD DEFINED 
The Internal Revenue Code contains a host of penalty pro-
visions designed to reinforce government claims to revenues 
owed by U.S. taxpayers. These provisions fall into two general 
categories: civil penalties and criminal penalties.80 Both a civil 
penalty and a criminal penalty potentially are applicable to the 
filing of a fraudulent tax return by a taxpayer in a situation 
like WorldComs. However, as discussed below, in the circum-
stance of an overpayment of tax, the civil tax fraud offense car-
ries no penalty.81 The criminal offense of signing a fraudulent 
or false income tax return, on the other hand, is subject to a 
positive penalty where a tax overpayment is involved.82 Unfor-
tunately, that penalty is extremely small in both real and rela-
tive terms and thus will not likely deter nor adequately punish 
the corporate malfeasance involved.83 Moreover, congressional 
attention to tax penalties, in general, has inexplicably failed to 
 
 79. See supra note 12. 
 80. A critical difference between civil and criminal penalties in this con-
text is that civil penalties may be collected through assessment procedures, 
whereas criminal penalties are imposed only after a criminal conviction. See 
Jasper v. Hellmich, 4 F.2d 852, 85556 (E.D. Mo. 1925) (holding that where 
penalties as opposed to taxes are involved, the Constitutions due process 
guarantees may not be disregarded by permitting assessment without a jury 
trial). Tax assessment procedures are described generally in §§ 6203, 6204. 
I.R.C. §§ 62036204 (2000). 
 81. I.R.C. § 6663 (2000). 
 82. Id. § 7206(1). 
 83. See infra Part III.D.3 (discussing penalty optimality). 
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focus on the criminal sanction.84 This section discusses the civil 
and criminal fraud penalty provisions, as well as the interest-
on-overpayment provision. 
1. Civil Tax Fraud 
The civil tax fraud statue imposes a substantial penalty 
that is added to the tax owed by the taxpayer where fraud is 
involved.85 However, the penalty is calculated under the statute 
as 75 percent of the amount by which the taxpayer fraudulently 
underpaid its tax.86 Thus, in a case like WorldComs, where an 
overpayment rather than an underpayment of tax is involved, 
application of the civil fraud penalty produces no fine. Accord-
ingly, although the Code purports to impose a civil penalty for 
fraud, that penalty, in effect, merely serves as a reinforcement 
of the statutory prohibition on tax evasion.87 Thus, only the  
 
 
 84. In 1998, Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury and the con-
gressional Joint Committee on Taxation to review the administration and im-
plementation by the IRS of the penalty provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code and make recommendations to simplify penalty administration. Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
§ 3801, 112 Stat. 685, 782. In sweeping studies released in July 1999 (the 
Joint Committee study ran to more than 600 pages in two volumes; the Treas-
ury study was a terse 188 pages), neither the Treasury nor the Joint Commit-
tee made reference to either of I.R.C. §§ 7206 or 7207. See STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND IN-
TEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 (INCLUDING PROVI-
SIONS RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS) (Comm. Print 1999), available 
at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/joint/hjoint01cp106.html (follow hyper-
links corresponding to JCS-3-99); TREASURY DEPT, THE PROBLEM OF CORPO-
RATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS (1999), available 
at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ctswhite.pdf. Although the 
Joint Committee noted that its study was confined to civil penalties, it is not 
clear why, since the congressional mandate was not limited to civil penalties. 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 § 3801; STAFF 
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra, at 13. Moreover, the Joint Committee 
did discuss the I.R.C. § 7203 criminal penalty for willful failure to pay esti-
mated tax and otherwise took a broad approach to its task. I.R.C. § 7203; 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra, at 1314, 112. For example, the 
Committee discussed whether or not to include the marriage penalty and 
provisions that deny deductions for failure to properly substantiate expenses. 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra, at 1314, 112. 
 85. I.R.C. § 6663. 
 86. Id. (If any part of any underpayment of tax required to be shown on a 
return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 75 
percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud.). 
 87. Id. § 7201. 
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criminal fraud penalty discussed in the following section ap-
plies to a corporation that inflates its taxable income in order to 
disguise the inflation of its accounting income. 
2. Criminal Tax Fraud 
When a corporation like WorldCom files a federal income 
tax return reflecting fraudulently inflated income, the corpora-
tion becomes subject to the felony fraud and false statement 
provisions of § 7206(1).88 That section applies to any person 
who [w]illfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or 
other document, which contains or is verified by a written dec-
laration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and 
which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every ma-
terial matter.89 Thus, for a corporation to be convicted under 
the fraud and false statement provision there must be (1) an 
officer who willfully signs the corporations tax return; (2) the 
execution of that signature under penalty of perjury; and (3) 
the officers knowledge that the return is false and inaccurate.90 
 
 88. Id. § 7206(1). Technically, two additional criminal provisions might 
apply. First, the general federal fraud statute, which is similar to § 7206(1), 
would apply to a taxpayer that knowingly and willfully (1) falsifies, conceals, 
or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any ma-
terially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) 
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any 
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry. 18 U.S.C.A. § 
1001 (West 2005). The IRS Criminal Investigation Division has jurisdiction to 
investigate violations of the fraud statue. 26 C.F.R. § 601.107(a) (2005); Inter-
nal Revenue Service, United States Code Statutes for Which Criminal Investi-
gation Has Jurisdiction, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,, 
id=108861,00.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005) (listing sections of the United 
States Code over which the Criminal Investigation Division has jurisdiction). 
Because 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 generally is co-extensive with I.R.C. § 7206(1), it is 
not discussed separately here. 
Second, a corporation might also be subject to the misdemeanor willful 
delivery or disclosure of false documents provisions of § 7207. I.R.C. § 7207 
(Supp. 2002). That section applies to [a]ny person who willfully delivers or 
discloses to the Secretary any list, return, account, statement, or other docu-
ment, known by him to be fraudulent or to be false as to any material matter. 
Id. To be convicted under this provision there must be, with respect to the cor-
poration, (1) a willful act of delivery or disclosure; and (2) knowledge that the 
document delivered is false and inaccurate. For purposes of § 7207, willful-
ness and knowledge are defined in the same manner, described below, as 
they are for purposes of § 7206(1). See infra notes 9193 and accompanying 
text. 
 89. I.R.C. § 7206(1). 
 90. Each of these acts, if committed by agents or employees of a corpora-
tion acting within the scope of their employment, is considered to have been 
committed by the corporation under general agency principles. See N.Y. Cent. 
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The willfulness required in the first element refers to a volun-
tary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.91 As to the 
execution of the signature under perjury, a corporate officer al-
ways signs the corporations tax return under penalty of per-
jury.92 Finally, a corporate defendant satisfies the knowledge  
 
 
& Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909) (We see no 
valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation 
which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents and offi-
cers, shall be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of 
its agents to whom it has intrusted authority to act . . . .). This includes acts 
related to the filing of corporate tax returns. United States v. Shortt Accoun-
tancy Corp., 785 F.2d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1986) (A corporation will be held 
liable under 26 U.S.C.S. § 7206(1) when its agent deliberately causes it to 
make and subscribe to a false income tax return.); Inner-City Temps., Inc. v. 
Commr, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 726, 733 (1990) (noting that for a corporation, req-
uisite fraudulent intent must be found in the acts of its officers and sharehold-
ers). For the corporation to be liable, the employee first must have intended 
that his act would have produced some benefit to the corporation, or some 
benefit both to himself and the corporation. United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 
800, 823 (11th Cir. 1984). The reason for requiring that an agent acted with 
intent to benefit the corporation is to prevent the corporation from being 
criminally liable for actions of its agents that are contrary to the companys 
interests or solely for the agents benefit. United States v. Automated Med. 
Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985). A corporation is not relieved of 
criminal liability, however, merely because the employee may have derived 
some personal benefit from his actions. United States v. Ruidoso Racing Assn, 
Inc. v. Commr, 476 F.2d 502, 50506 (10th Cir. 1973); Crescent Mfg. Co. v. 
Commr, 7 T.C.M. (CCH) 630, 63132 (1948). Moreover, a corporation gener-
ally may not avoid criminal liability by simply asserting that an agent violated 
a corporate policy of adhering to the law. United States v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 
467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) ([Corporate] liability may attach without 
proof that the conduct was within the agents actual authority, and even 
though it may have been contrary to express instructions.); Contl Baking Co. 
v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 150 (6th Cir. 1960) (A corporation which em-
ploys an agent in a responsible position cannot say that the man was only au-
thorized to act legally and the corporation will not answer for his violations of 
law which inure to the corporations benefit.). 
 91. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973). 
 92. I.R.C. § 6065 (2000). A corporations tax return must be signed by its 
president, vice president, treasurer, assistant treasurer, chief accounting offi-
cer, or any other corporate officer authorized to sign. Id. § 6062; INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., TREASURY DEPT, CAT. NO. 1145ST, INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
FORMS 1120 AND 1120-A 3 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/i1120_a.pdf. The corporate tax return includes the following statement 
immediately above the officers signature line: Under penalties of perjury, I 
declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules 
and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct, 
and complete. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TREASURY DEPT, FORM 1120, U.S. 
CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURN (OMB NO. 1545-0123) 1 (2004), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120.pdf. 
BOISE_3FMT 11/22/2005 04:30:44 PM 
166 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:144 
 
element of the offense if corporations employees collectively 
possess the requisite knowledge.93 
B. MATERIALITY AND HARM 
It is important to note that a tax deficiency is not a requi-
site element of § 7206(1).94 That is, the filing of a fraudulent re-
turn subjects the taxpayer to the tax fraud penalty regardless 
of whether the fraud results in an underpayment of tax. Tax-
payers have attempted to read a tax deficiency element into the 
statute by focusing on the requirement that a return be true 
and correct as to every material matter.95 A false statement 
on a return cannot be material, so the argument goes, if it 
does not result in a loss of tax revenue to the government. The 
courts responses to this issue inform one normative question 
raised by this Articles proposal to use equity to significantly 
increase the penalty for tax fraudnamely, whether a substan-
tial penalty, or any penalty at all, should be attached to an of-
fense that results in an overpayment of tax. 
Courts have long held that, for purposes of § 7206(1), a 
false statement is material if it is necessary to compute the tax 
involved,96 or has the potential for hindering the IRSs efforts 
to monitor and verify the tax liability of the corporation and 
 
 93. The First Circuit has described it this way: Corporations compart-
mentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties and opera-
tions into smaller components. The aggregate of those components constitutes 
the corporations knowledge of a particular operation. United States v. Bank 
of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Shortt Ac-
countancy Corp., 785 F.2d at 1454. Were it otherwise, a corporation could 
avoid liability by simply asserting that no single employee comprehended the 
full import of information that was obtained by several employees. Bank of 
New England, 821 F.2d at 856. 
 94. I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000); e.g., United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 
736 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Marabelles, 724 F.2d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Brooksby, 668 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Jacobson, 547 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Miller, 491 
F.2d 638, 646 (5th Cir. 1974). A tax deficiency is also not an element of the 
misdemeanor willful delivery or disclosure of false documents provisions of 
I.R.C. § 7207. I.R.C. § 7207 (Supp. 2002); Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 
343, 352 (1965). 
 95. § 7206(1); see also Sansone, 380 U.S. at 352 (construing § 7207); Mara-
belles, 724 F.2d at 1380 (construing § 7206(1)); United States v. Coppola, 425 
F.2d 660, 661 (2d Cir. 1969) (construing § 7207). 
 96. United States v. Warden, 545 F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that 
omitted items may be material where reporting is necessary for the taxpayer 
to estimate and compute his tax correctly); United States v. Rayor, 204 F. 
Supp. 486, 490 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (to same effect). 
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the taxpayer.97 The cases establishing this materiality stan-
dard present three distinct factual situations: those in which 
the taxpayers fraudulent return results in an underpayment of 
taxes, those in which the return results in no change in the 
taxes paid, and those resulting in an overpayment of taxes. As 
one intuitively would expect, courts uniformly have found ma-
teriality in the first situation. That is, if a taxpayer has under-
reported taxable income and, as a result, underpaid her income 
tax, courts virtually always find the tax return to be false with 
respect to a material matter.98 However, the courts have 
reached exactly the same conclusion in the second situation, as 
well. For example, in United States v. Marashi, the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected the taxpayers claim that his return was not 
fraudulent because available deductions would have left him 
with no tax deficiency.99 The court held that falsifying gross re- 
 
 
 
 97. United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 461 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting 
United States v. Greenberg, 735 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1984)); accord Greenberg, 
735 F.2d at 31 (The purpose of § 7206(1) is not simply to ensure that the tax-
payer pay the proper amount of taxesthough that is surely one of its goals. 
Rather, that section is intended to ensure also that the taxpayer not make 
misstatements that could hinder the Internal Revenue Service . . . in carrying 
out such functions as the verification of the accuracy of that return or a re-
lated tax return.); United States v. Taylor, 574 F.2d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. 337, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ([A] state-
ment is material if it is capable of influencing actions of the IRS in any matter 
within its jurisdiction.); United States v. DiVarco, 343 F. Supp. 101, 103 (N.D. 
Ill. 1972) ([W]ithout truthful representation as to all matters it becomes ad-
ministratively more difficult, if not impossible, for the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) to compute the amount of tax due or to check on the accuracy of re-
turns.), aff d, 484 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1973). Under this standard, even a 
failure to properly characterize the source of income may be material for these 
purposes. DiVarco, 484 F.2d at 673 (The plain language of the statute does 
not exclude the matter of the source of income from the definition of material 
matter. In light of the need for accurate information concerning the source of 
income so that the Internal Revenue Service can police and verify the report-
ing of individuals and corporations, a misstatement as to the source of income 
is a material matter.); United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 532 F. Supp. 1360, 
1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (to same effect). 
 98. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 350 (1973); Sansone, 
380 U.S. at 352; United States v. Bove, 155 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Holland, 880 F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1989); Marabelles, 724 F.2d at 
1380; United States v. Fern, 696 F.2d 1269, 127475 (11th Cir. 1983); 
Brooksby, 668 F.2d at 1103; United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385, 39192 
(7th Cir. 1977); Warden, 545 F.2d at 37; Coppola, 425 F.2d at 662 (construing 
§ 7207). 
 99. 913 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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ceipts was a material violation of the statute irrespective of the 
fact that the deception did not increase the taxpayers tax li-
ability.100 
The most compelling case for finding a lack of materiality 
is in the third situation, where the taxpayers false return re-
sults in too much tax being paid. As government tax revenues 
actually are augmented (at least temporarily), one might expect 
courts to find that any false statement on the return would be 
immaterial. Nonetheless, even in this circumstance, the imposi-
tion of tax fraud liability has been sustained. In United States 
v. Goldman, for example, the taxpayer sought to dismiss a 
charge of fraud under § 7206(1) on the ground that any mis-
statements contained in his tax returns were immaterial be-
cause they resulted in an overpayment of taxes.101 The court 
declined to dismiss the charge and held that a false statement 
could be material even if the result was that the taxpayer paid 
too much tax.102 In short, a false statement regarding a matter 
necessary to correctly compute ones tax liability or that hin-
ders the IRSs determination of tax liability is material, regard-
less of its ultimate effect on tax liability.103 
 
 100. Id.; see also United States v. Minneman, 143 F.3d 274, 279 (7th Cir. 
1998); Greenberg, 735 F.2d at 3132; Taylor, 574 F.2d at 235; United States v. 
Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 343 (2d Cir. 1978); Rayor, 204 F. Supp. at 490. 
 101. I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000); 439 F. Supp. 337, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
 102. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. at 344; accord United States v. Fawaz, 881 
F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that an understatement of expenses on 
income tax return was a material matter); United States v. Lamberti, 847 F.2d 
1531, 1536 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding taxpayers conviction under § 7206(1) 
for filing returns that overstated income); United States v. Bouzanis, No. 00 
CR 1065, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3289, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2003) (rejecting 
argument that taxpayers overstatement of income, although false, was not 
fraudulent because it was not material); United States v. Lee, 667 F. Supp. 
1404, 1419 (D. Colo. 1987) (noting that overstatement of income to conceal 
payments made to others is a violation of § 7206(1)), revd sub nom. United 
States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Potstada, 
206 F. Supp. 792, 79394 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (rejecting taxpayers motion to dis-
miss tax fraud charge on the ground that false statement in gift tax return 
procured for the government a tax that was not owing, and was thus not mate-
rial). 
 103. The holdings in these cases are reinforced by the fact that Congress 
made tax fraud under § 7206(1) a crime separate and apart from tax evasion 
under § 7201. I.R.C. §§ 7201, 7206(1) (2000); see also Goldman, 439 F. Supp. at 
344 (The conclusion that an overstatement of income may result in a [fraud] 
prosecution is buttressed by the congressional determination to make 
§ 7206(1) a crime separate and apart from income tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7201.); supra note 23 (discussing the relationship between §§ 7201 and 
7206(1)). 
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This construction of materiality follows from the fact that  
§ 7206(1) is, in essence, a perjury statuteit punishes the act 
of executing and submitting a false return.104 Thus, when the 
false return is filed, the offense is complete, regardless of the 
tax consequences that may flow from that return.105 Filing a 
false tax return is punishable because it causes harm to the 
government. As suggested by the standard for materiality, fil-
ing a false return makes it more difficult for the IRS to monitor 
and verify the taxpayers income.106 A number of cases have 
addressed this harm in more specific terms. 
For example, in Badaracco v. Commissioner, two business 
partners filed fraudulent tax returns and then voluntarily dis-
closed the fraud in amended returns and paid the tax owed.107 
When they were assessed a penalty for filing the original 
fraudulent returns, the taxpayers asserted that as a matter of 
equity and public policy the standard statute of limitations 
should apply (as opposed to the unlimited time available to the 
government to make assessments on fraudulent returns), 
thereby barring imposition of the fraud penalty.108 They argued 
that the amended return provided the government all of the in-
formation necessary to make a knowledgeable assessment of 
the tax owed, and, thus, the statutory provision eliminating the 
limitations period in cases of fraud was not justified.109 The Su-
 
 104. See United States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964, 980 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(Whether there was an actual tax deficiency is irrelevant because the statute 
is a perjury statute.); United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 
1990) (Section 7206(1) is a perjury statute; it is irrelevant whether there was 
an actual tax deficiency.); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385, 392 (7th 
Cir. 1977); United States v. Romanow, 509 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating 
that the primary purpose of § 7206(1) is to impose penalties of perjury on 
those who willfully falsify their returns); United States v. DiVarco, 484 F.2d 
670, 673 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that willful and knowing false statements 
about a source of income are material under § 7206(1), regardless of the effect 
of the statements). One scholar has characterized certain false statement 
crimes as hybrids that reflect attributes of both lying crimes (such as per-
jury) and misleading crimes (such as fraud). See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Mis-
leading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, 
Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 17374, 19198 (2001). 
 105. Marashi, 913 F.2d at 736 (quoting United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 
1204, 1212 n.10 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
 106. See supra notes 9697. Indeed, this is typical of virtually all perjury 
statutes, which one scholar has characterized as involving deception intended 
to obstruct the administration of justice or government investigation or opera-
tions. Green, supra note 104, at 17374. 
 107. 464 U.S. 386, 389 (1984). 
 108. Id. at 389. 
 109. Id. at 39798. 
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preme Court rejected this argument, noting that the provision 
eliminating the limitations period for fraudulent returns was 
justified by the governments need for additional time to over-
come specific detriments resulting from the original fraudulent 
return.110 First, the Court found that where a fraudulent return 
is filed, the governments ability to ascertain the taxpayers 
true tax liability may be compromised; during the period of 
time that the government relies on the false return, the tax-
payers underlying records may be falsified or even de-
stroyed.111 Second, the Court found that the fraudulent return 
means the government must be particularly diligent and thor-
ough in its determination of the taxpayers correct tax liability 
because filing the original fraudulent return makes the tax-
payer inherently less trustworthy.112 Third, the difficulties 
that attend a civil fraud investigation are compounded because 
of the potential need to refer the case for criminal prosecu-
tion.113 
In United States v. Goldman,114 the court discussed two 
additional burdens related to those identified by the Supreme 
Court in Badaracco. First, the court noted that [t]he accuracy 
of items of taxable income reported on the return of one indi-
vidual or entity may affect the ability of the IRS to assess the 
tax liability of another taxpayer.115 That is, the tax returns of 
different taxpayers may contain information about the same 
transactions. If that information is falsified in one return, the 
IRS must devote additional resources to the determination of 
which return is correct. The court also observed that over-
stated income may shield from scrutiny falsely inflated deduc- 
 
 
 
 110. Id. at 398. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 399 (noting that this difficulty is not mitigated by the filing of 
an amended return as the amended return comes carrying no special or sig-
nificant imprimatur; instead, it comes from a taxpayer who already has made 
false statements under penalty of perjury). 
 113. Id. 
 114. 439 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
 115. Id. at 344; see also United States v. Fawaz, 881 F.2d 259, 264 (6th Cir. 
1989) (A false statement is material when it hampers the IRS in verify-
ing . . . related returns submitted by the defendant taxpayer or by a business 
entity in which he or she has a direct interest.); United States v. Greenberg, 
735 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that the prohibition on false statements 
is designed in part to ensure that the IRS is able to verify the accuracy of re-
lated tax returns). 
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tions, thus making it more difficult for the IRS to check the ac-
curacy of a return.116 
Finally, a more broadly applicable harm associated with 
the filing of a fraudulent return is the significant potential for 
undermining voluntary compliance with the tax rules. The U.S. 
tax system relies heavily on truthful self-reporting by taxpay-
ers.117 As the Ninth Circuit observed in affirming a conviction 
under I.R.C. § 7206, [B]ecause the tax system is based on self-
reporting, the government depends upon the good faith and in-
tegrity of each potential taxpayer to disclose honestly all infor-
mation relevant to tax liability.118 If each potential taxpayer 
does not disclose honestly all information relevant to his or her 
tax liability, the integrity of the nations tax system is dam-
aged.119 If the number of false tax returns grows, so, too, will 
public doubt about the accuracy and truthfulness of all tax re-
turns within the system. If the public perceives that there is 
 
 116. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. at 344; see also Spies v. United States, 317 
U.S. 492, 495 (1943) ([T]axpayers neglect or deceit may prejudice the orderly 
and punctual administration of the system as well as the revenues them-
selves.). As discussed in supra text accompanying notes 9596, an element of 
the offense of filing a false tax return under I.R.C. § 7206(1) is that the false 
statement on the return be material, a term that in this context the courts 
have interpreted to mean a false statement that could have influenced or af-
fected the IRS in carrying out the functions committed to it by law. United 
States v. DiRico, 78 F.3d 732, 736 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing to United States v. 
Romanow, 509 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1975)); see also I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000); 
Fawaz, 881 F.2d at 26364; United States v. Taylor, 574 F.2d 232, 235 (5th 
Cir. 1978); United States v. DiVarco, 484 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1973). Thus, 
the language of the tax fraud statute itself, as interpreted by the courts, sug-
gests that false statements risk impeding IRS attempts to determine a par-
ticular individuals tax liability. 
 117. See Spies, 317 U.S. at 495 (The United States has relied for the col-
lection of its income tax largely upon the taxpayers own disclosures rather 
than upon a system of withholding the tax from him by those from whom in-
come may be received. This system can function successfully only if those 
within and near taxable income keep and render true accounts.); United 
States v. Lowe, No. 95-10111, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1628, at *9 (9th Cir. Jan. 
18, 1996). Although the U.S. tax system today relies much more heavily on 
withholding than it did in 1943, when Spies was decided, there remain enough 
exceptions to withholding to warrant concern about any trends in taxpayer 
behavior that would tend to undermine voluntary compliance. 
 118. Lowe, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1628, at *910 (quoting United States v. 
Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975) (internal quotations omitted). 
 119. See United States v. Bove, 155 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1998) (observing 
that filing a false tax return in violation of § 7206 is an offense that under-
mines the integrity of the nations tax system); see also U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1 introductory cmt. (2004) (The criminal tax laws 
are designed to protect the public interest in preserving the integrity of the 
nations tax system.). 
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widespread gaming of the system for personal advantage 
(whether by understatement or overstatement of income), vol-
untary compliance is likely to be sharply reduced.120 Thus, as 
the Seventh Circuit has observed, For the . . . system to func-
tion properly, there must be not just truthful reporting, but 
also the ability to assure truthful reporting.121 
In summary, a tax return may be fraudulent with respect 
to a material matter regardless of whether there is a corre-
sponding loss of tax revenue to the government. This conclusion 
is derived from the fact that the act of filing a false return 
harms the government. The extent to which the harm caused 
by the filing of a fraudulent return should influence the amount 
of the fraud penalty is part of the discussion of public policy in 
Part III.D.3. The following section begins to frame that issue by 
examining the magnitude of the current penalty. 
C. MAGNITUDE OF CURRENT PENALTY 
Vigorous IRS prosecution of corporations filing income tax 
returns in violation of the criminal tax fraud provisions likely 
would have no discernible deterrent effect because only nomi-
nal penalties are available. For example, the maximum fine 
imposed on a corporation that violates § 7206(1) is $500,000.122 
 
 120. Although now a number of years out of date, the IRS commissioned a 
study in 1984 to better understand what factors encouraged noncompliance 
with the tax system. YANKELOVITCH, SKELLY, & WHITE, INC., TAXPAYER ATTI-
TUDES STUDY: FINAL REPORT 2 (1984). As one measure of compliance, the 
study evaluated attitudes condoning tax cheating. Id. at 56. A key variable 
that was closely linked to attitudes condoning tax noncompliance was skepti-
cism about human integrity. Id. As defined by the study, this variable reflects 
the belief that most people cheat; indeed, that the only people who do not 
cheat are those who cannot find opportunity to do so. Id. When taxpayers were 
asked to assign weights to several reasons why other people cheat on taxes, 
one of the factors most responsible for cheating was the perception that the 
tax system is unfair. Id. at 62. There is substantial economic literature on the 
effect of taxpayer attitudes on tax compliance, with most researchers conclud-
ing that taxpayer perceptions of fairness in the tax system and perceptions of 
compliance by other taxpayers significantly affect the overall rate of tax com-
pliance. See, e.g., Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence 
Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE 
PAY TAXES 193, 214 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992). 
 121. United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385, 391 (7th Cir. 1977) (emphasis 
added). 
 122. Although I.R.C. § 7206(5)(B) provides a penalty of $500,000, the 
Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984 imposed alternative maximum fines 
for federal crimes occurring after December 31, 1984. I.R.C. § 7206(5)(B) 
(2000); Pub. L. No. 98-596, § 6, 98 Stat. 3134, 313638. The maximum fine ap-
plicable to an organization convicted of a felony is equal to the greater of (1) 
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However, the actual fine imposed would be considerably less 
because of the overlay of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.123 According 
to the Guidelines, sentencing for the filing of fraudulent or false 
returns under § 7206 begins with a base offense level that is 
determined by the amount of the tax loss.124 Because over-
statements of income do not produce a tax loss, the default base 
offense level results in a fine of a mere $5,000,125 which may be 
increased to $40,000 if the crime involves sophisticated 
means.126 Assuming that sophisticated means are used, and 
that the corporation is subject to the maximum culpability fac-
tor enhancement provided by the Guidelines, the fine would 
still not exceed $160,000.127 Whether or not the lower fine de-
 
$500,000 and (2) an alternative fine equal to twice the amount of any pecuni-
ary gain derived from the offense. Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984 § 6. 
A corporation violating the misdemeanor willful delivery or disclosure of false 
documents provisions of I.R.C. § 7207 would be subject to a maximum fine of 
$200,000. I.R.C. § 7207 (Supp. 2002). Although § 7207 provides a maximum 
fine of $50,000, under the Criminal Fine Improvement Act of 1987, the maxi-
mum fine for an organization convicted of a misdemeanor not resulting in 
death is equal to the greater of (1) $200,000 and (2) an alternative fine equal 
to twice the amount of any pecuniary gain derived from the offense. Pub. L. 
No. 100-185, § 6, 101 Stat. 1279, 1280 (codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 3571 
(2000)). The alternative fines do not apply, however, if their application would 
unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571(c)
(d). It is likely that the alternative fines would not apply in a case like World-
Coms; although the company clearly benefited from exaggerating its taxable 
income to disguise inflation of its book income, quantifying that benefit would 
be extremely difficult. 
 123. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2004). In the 
recent case of United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court struck down as un-
constitutional the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines that made them 
mandatory. 125 S. Ct. 738, 764 (2005) (Breyer, J., majority opinion in part). 
Thus, after Booker, district courts are not bound to apply the Guidelines, 
[but] must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentenc-
ing. Id. at 767; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000). Therefore, although courts 
will not be required to impose the lower sentence provided in the Guidelines 
for filing fraudulent and false returns, they nevertheless may do so absent 
other compelling considerations. As a result, the penalty under § 7206 likely 
will remain inconsequential. 
 124. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 119, § 2T1.1(a). 
 125. Id. §§ 2T1.1(a)(2), 2T1.1(b)(2), 8C2.4(d). 
 126. Id. §§ 2T1.1(b)(2), 8C2.4(d). 
 127. This figure is based on a maximum culpability multiplier of four, 
which is arrived at by assuming that the corporate taxpayer (1) tolerated 
criminal activity, (2) had a prior history of criminal activity, and (3) obstructed 
the investigation of the offense. Id. §§ 8C2.5(a)(c), (e), 8C2.6. This penalty 
would be imposed in lieu of the $500,000 maximum provided by the statute. 
See id. § 8C3.1(a). 
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termined under the Guidelines actually would be imposed, it is 
a pittance compared, for example, to the nearly $300 million 
that WorldCom is reported to have collected in tax refunds.128 
One might suspect that Congress intended to impose only 
nominal punishment on those who file false tax returns. While 
this is possible, the fine imposed for criminal tax evasion under 
§ 7201 is equally small,129 despite the fact that the government 
clearly considers tax evasion a serious offense.130 The better 
explanation is that this is simply an example of the tendency 
for civil penalties in this area to be significantly greater than 
the corresponding criminal sanction.131 Perhaps as a result of 
this tendency, criminal prosecution has not played a significant 
role in the governments response to tax fraud and tax eva-
sion.132 The higher burden of proof and the need to establish 
 
 128. See Blumenstein et al., supra note 15. 
 129. I.R.C. § 7201 (2000) (Any person who willfully attempts in any man-
ner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof 
shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, 
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in 
the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, to-
gether with the costs of prosecution.). 
 130. See, e.g., Reducing the Tax Gap Can Contribute to Fiscal Sustainabil-
ity but Will Require a Variety of Strategies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Finance (GAO-05-527T), 109th Cong. 12 (2005) (statement of David M. 
Walker, Comptroller General of the United States) (noting the governments 
longstanding concern about the $312 to $353 billion tax gap created by tax-
payer noncompliance). 
 131. This tendency is puzzling because criminal penalties typically are con-
sidered to be punitive in nature, while civil penalties are remedial in nature 
and designed to compensate the government for its loss from the fraud. See 
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398401 (1938). Given this understanding 
of the respective purposes of criminal and civil penalties, one would expect 
that the former would be significantly greater than the latter. In fact, the op-
posite is true, and the courts have reinforced this fact by concluding that pen-
alties of 50 percent of an understatement of income attributable to fraud are 
remedial rather than punitive in nature. E.g., id. at 40103; Barnette v. 
Commr, 95 T.C. 341, 34748 (1990). 
 132. Between 1998 and 2003, the IRS imposed a total of approximately 
14,500 civil penalties for tax fraud. This figure includes civil fraud penalties 
assessed, after abatements, in five categories: individual income tax, corporate 
income tax, employment tax, excise tax, and estate and gift tax. See Internal 
Revenue Service, SOI Tax Stats - Enforcing Laws, Civil Penalties Assessed 
and Abated, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/compliancestats/article/0,,id=97177,00 
.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005). During the same six-year period, however, a 
total of only approximately 3,600 indictments were brought under the Internal 
Revenue Codes criminal fraud provisions. See Internal Revenue Service, En-
forcement Strategy - Criminal Investigation (CI), Criminal Investigation (CI) 
Annual Business Reports, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/ 
0,,id=107522,00.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005). This figure includes indict-
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the requisite intent make it difficult for the government to suc-
cessfully prosecute taxpayers under criminal provisions such as 
§§ 7201 and 7206(1).133 Thus, the civil tax fraud provision has 
become the staple of federal tax evasion and tax fraud prosecu-
tions, and the penalty associated with that offense is significant 
in the case of underpayments of tax.134 Unfortunately, as noted 
above, the civil tax fraud offense is not subject to any penalty 
where the fraudulent tax return gives rise to an overpayment 
of tax. What is needed is a more robust penalty to deter corpo-
rations from making fraudulent statements to the IRS in order 
to bolster false earnings reports to shareholders. 
D. GETTING A REFUND 
Before discussing how refund claims might be denied in 
circumstances that involve false tax returns, it may be helpful 
to review the refund process itself. As will be seen, the process 
is somewhat mechanical, and the IRSs role in the process, to 
date, generally has been ministerial in nature. 
1. The Process 
A corporate tax-refund claim that does not simply involve 
an erroneous payment generally arises from a dispute between 
the corporation and the government about the correct tax 
treatment of some item of income, credit, or deduction. In such 
circumstances, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to 
make a refund only if it is determined that there was an over- 
 
 
 
ments brought under §§ 7206(1)(2), 7207. Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 7206(1)(2), 
7207 (2000 & Supp. 2002, respectively). A direct comparison of civil and crimi-
nal fraud penalties leveled against corporate offenders is not possible, as the 
IRS has only recently begun to compile separate statistics relating to criminal 
penalties for corporate tax fraud. However, in general, the IRS apparently has 
heavily favored civil sanctions in tax fraud cases, as evidenced by the fact that 
civil penalties outnumbered criminal penalties by more than five to one during 
this period. 
 133. See 1 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 143 (It 
is a felony to sign a return unless the signer believes it to be true and correct 
as to every material matter. However, criminal prosecution and conviction is 
[sic] rare because the government must prove the offending taxpayers guilty 
state of mind beyond a reasonable doubt. Two of the Codes civil penal-
ties . . . provide the principal means by which the Federal government assures 
accuracy of tax return information.) (emphasis added). 
 134. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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payment of tax.135 Although the term is not explicitly defined 
in the Internal Revenue Code, the Supreme Court has held that 
an overpayment arises from the payment of more than is 
rightfully due.136 Thus, a company that has paid federal in-
come tax on earnings that were fraudulently inflated quite 
clearly has made an overpayment for these purposes and may 
seek a refund of the excess tax paid. 
The Treasury Secretary is not merely authorized to issue 
refunds. The Code provides that where a person makes an 
overpayment, the Secretary shall, subject to [certain excep-
tions] refund any balance to such person.137 The refund re-
quirement, as applicable to corporations, is subject to only 
three exceptions.138 First, the Secretary may credit the amount 
of the overpayment against any outstanding internal revenue 
tax liability of the corporation that made the overpayment.139 
Next, the amount of any overpayment to be refunded must be 
reduced by the amount of any past-due, legally enforceable 
debts owed to federal agencies.140 Finally, if the corporation 
owes past-due, legally enforceable, state income tax obligations, 
the refund is further reduced by those amounts.141 Apart from 
these exceptions, nothing in the statute authorizes the Secre-
tary to depart from the command of § 6402 that an overpay-
ment of tax be refunded to the taxpayer. 
 
 
 
 135. See I.R.C. § 6402(a) (2000). 
 136. Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 531 (1947). The only statu-
tory content given to the term is found in I.R.C. § 6401(a), which states that an 
overpayment includes amounts assessed or collected from the taxpayer after 
the expiration of the statute of limitations for such assessment or collection. 
I.R.C. § 6401(a) (2000). 
 137. I.R.C. § 6402(a) (emphasis added); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-1 
(1985). In lieu of receiving a refund check, a taxpayer may elect to credit the 
amount of any refund against the amount of estimated income tax for any tax-
able year. See § 6402(b). 
 138. This statement assumes that the corporation has timely filed a refund 
claim in accordance with the provisions of I.R.C. § 6511. I.R.C. § 6511 (Supp. 
2002). A number of issues have arisen in the interpretation of these provi-
sions, the treatment of which is beyond the scope of this Article. See MICHAEL 
I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 11.05 (rev. 2d ed. 2002). 
 139. See I.R.C. §§ 6402(a), (e)(3). 
 140. See Id. §§ 6402(d), (e)(3). In the case of individuals, refunds must be 
reduced by amounts of past-due child support before being reduced for debts 
owed to federal agencies. See Id. §§ 6402(c), (e)(3). 
 141. Id. § 6402(e)(3). 
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No refund will be forthcoming, however, unless and until 
the taxpayer files a timely claim for refund.142 A refund claim 
must be filed within three years from the time the return was 
filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of 
such periods expires later.143 The amount of the refund to 
which the taxpayer is entitled may be limited by the timeliness 
of the refund claim. If the refund claim is filed within three 
years from the time the return was filed, the refund may not 
exceed the portion of the tax paid during the three-year period 
immediately preceding the filing of the claim, plus the period of 
any extension granted for the filing of the return.144 If the re-
fund claim is not filed within three years from the time the re-
turn was filed, the refund is limited to the portion of the tax 
paid during the two years immediately preceding the filing of 
the claim.145 The three-year statutory refund period may not be 
extended except in conjunction with an extension of the limita-
tions period for the assessment of tax.146 
A refund claim may be filed in one of two ways. First, if a 
corporation files a properly executed original income tax return 
reflecting an overpayment of tax for the taxable year (for ex-
ample because of excess quarterly estimated tax payments), the 
tax return itself serves as the claim for credit or refund of such 
overpayment.147 Alternatively, where the overpayment is not 
discovered until after a tax return has been filed, the corpora-
tion must file an amended return on Form 1120X.148 In the  
 
 
 
 142. Id. § 6511(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-1 (1985) (noting that the Sec-
retary may not make a refund unless a claim for credit or refund is timely filed 
by the taxpayer). The refund claim also is a jurisdictional prerequisite for the 
filing of a refund suit. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (2000) (noting that no refund suit 
may be filed until a refund claim has been filed with the Secretary). 
 143. I.R.C. § 6511(a). If no return was filed by the taxpayer, the refund 
claim must be filed within two years from the time the tax was paid. Id. 
 144. See id. § 6511(b). The three-year statutory refund period is relatively 
short. If a corporations earnings inflation is not discovered within the three-
year period, then no refund will be available unless the limitations period has 
been extended in conjunction with an extension of the limitations period for 
the assessment of tax. See id. §§ 6511(c), 6501(c)(4) (Supp. 2002 & West 2005, 
respectively). 
 145. See id. § 6511(b)(2)(B). 
 146. See id. §§ 6501(c)(4), 6511(c). 
 147. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(5) (as amended in 1997). A corporation 
files its income tax return on Form 1120. Id. 
 148. Id. § 301.6402-3(a)(3) (as amended in 1997). 
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situation involving inflated earnings, a corporation like World-
Com knowingly files a false tax return reflecting excessive in-
come and thus an income tax liability that is greater than what 
is rightfully due. The overpayment of tax is discovered when 
the SEC uncovers the fraudulent inflation of earnings. Thus, 
claims for refunds of tax paid on inflated earnings are filed by 
means of amended returns. 
Once the amended return has been duly filed by the corpo-
ration, the IRS has six months to review the refund claim and 
determine whether to allow it.149 If the IRS disallows the re-
fund claim or fails to respond within six months from the date 
the refund claim is filed, the corporation may file a refund 
suit.150 The suit may only be brought in an appropriate federal 
district court or in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.151 
2. The Overpayment Interest Bonus 
Not only is a company that has fraudulently overstated its 
income entitled to a ready refund of the tax paid, the offending 
corporation also is entitled to receive interest from the U.S. 
Treasury on the amount of any overpayment of tax. Section 
6611152 directs that interest shall be allowed and paid upon 
any overpayment . . . of any internal revenue tax at a rate that 
currently is set at 2.5 percent for refund amounts in excess of 
$10,000.153 Generally, the interest is payable from the date of 
the overpayment of tax, except that if the IRS refunds an over-
payment within forty-five days of the filing of the refund claim, 
interest is not payable during that forty-five-day period.154 The  
 
 
 
 
 
 149. I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) (2000). As discussed in Part IV.B, infra, a tax re-
fund in excess of $2 million may not be paid out until the Joint Committee has 
received a report of the refund and has had thirty days to review it. 
 150. Treas. Reg. § 301.6532-1(a) (1967). 
 151. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2000). 
 152. I.R.C. § 6611 (2000). 
 153. See Rev. Rul. 2004-111, 2004-51 I.R.B. 989. A rate of 4 percent applies 
to corporate tax refunds of $10,000 or less. Id. 
 154. I.R.C. §§ 6611(b)(2), (e)(2). See supra Part II.B for a discussion of 
overpayment in this context. For an argument that interest should be pay-
able on tax overpayments even during this forty-five-day period, see Jeremy R. 
Polk, Comment, Compensation for the Fruit of the Funds Use: The Takings 
Clause and Tax Refunds, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 657, 65761 (2004). 
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effect of this provision is to permit a corporation to use the fed-
eral income tax system to disguise its accounting fraud, while 
insuring that should the fraud be discovered, the corporation at 
least will be compensated in part for the time value of the 
money that it deposited with the U.S. Treasury to accomplish 
the fraud. The Internal Revenue Code thus unwittingly pro-
vides something akin to the unwind provisions associated 
with abusive corporate tax shelters.155 
The federal income tax-refund process as just outlined is 
fairly straightforward. Refunds of overpayments of tax are 
statutorily required, and once the procedural requisites have 
been satisfied and a refund claim filed, the only task for the 
IRS is to determine whether the tax paid is more than the 
amount rightfully due. If so, the refund must be allowed with 
accrued interest on the overpayment. The set of provisions 
leading to this result seems impervious to considerations of 
fairness or justice. However, it is precisely at the intersection of 
strict legal rules and apparent injustice that courts historically 
have exercised their equitable powers.156 That is, the role of eq-
uity within the legal system is to dispense justice at the inter-
stices of inflexible legal rules.157 The following section ad-
dresses the application of equity in the context of tax-refund 
suits.158 
 
 155. A feature of most abusive corporate tax shelters is a contractual provi-
sion entitling the participant in the shelter to effectively unwind the transac-
tion if the intended tax consequences are denied by the IRS. This type of pro-
vision (also referred to as contractual protection) now figures in the 
definition of a tax shelter under corporate tax shelter regulations issued in 
2003. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (as amended in 2003). To the extent that a 
corporation inflating earnings at the cost of an increase in income taxes can 
recoup that cost through a tax refund when the earnings inflation is discov-
ered, it has effectively secured contractual protection for its fraudulent activ-
ity. 
 156. See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Proce-
dure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 430 (2003) (Equity moderates the rigid and uni-
form application of law by incorporating standards of fairness and morality 
into the judicial process.). 
 157. See Kennedy, supra note 31, at 609 (In a broad jurisprudential sense, 
equity means the power to do justice in a particular case by exercising discre-
tion to mitigate the rigidity of strict legal rules.). 
 158. See Alamo Natl Bank v. Commr, 95 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1938) 
(The right and wrong of things and equitable principles have a place in tax 
matters.). 
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III.  REFUND SUITS AND EQUITY 
Equity has been defined as [j]ustice administered accord-
ing to fairness as contrasted with the strictly formulated rules 
of common law.159 Because WorldCom falsified its tax returns 
to lend credibility to, and avoid detection of, its fraudulent fi-
nancial activity, denying the companys claim for a refund of 
tax on the falsely reported income arguably would be equita-
ble in the sense of responding to normative conceptions of 
fairness. But equity involves more than abstract notions of mo-
rality and fair play. It also has a well-defined formal dimen-
sion, which governs the circumstances under which a court may 
dispense an equitable remedy.160 Unless a tax-refund claim is 
 
 159. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990); see also Main, supra 
note 156, at 430. As a jurisprudential system, equity originated with the 
Chancellors of the English High Court of Chancery as an alternative to the 
common law dispensed at the same time (and often with contradictory results) 
by the judges of the English law courts. See generally KEETON, supra note 32, 
at 1136 (discussing the development of equitable jurisdiction of English 
courts); John J. Farley, III, Robin Hood Jurisprudence: The Triumph of Equity 
in American Tort Law, 65 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 997, 1001 (1991). Over the centu-
ries, the common law courts became increasingly inflexible as a result of a sys-
tem of writs that required a plaintiff to fit his claim to a particular form of ac-
tion or be thrown out of court. See Farley, supra, at 100001. By contrast, the 
Court of Chancery administered a jurisprudence that grew progressively more 
popular because it blunted the harsher effects of the law courts system of 
writs. Farley, supra, at 1001; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered 
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 91819 (1987). Among other reasons, Chancery was 
preferred because of the equitable nature of the remedies it dispensed. The 
court could make restitutionary awards of money or property, issue declara-
tory relief, impose so-called coercive remedies, and enforce its coercive reme-
dies through the power of contempt, a power not available to a law court. See 
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1, at 49 (abr. 2d ed. 1993) (explaining 
that a coercive remedy did not merely declare the defendants debt or obliga-
tion, but instead commanded the defendant to do or refrain from a specified 
act). A law court, however, could only issue judgments declaring a defendants 
debt or obligation and order seizure of the defendants property to satisfy the 
judgment. DOBBS, supra, § 2.1, at 49. The rivalry between Chancery and the 
law courts in England was not finally resolved until passage of the Judicature 
Acts of 1873, which created a unified court structure charged with applying 
both equity and the common law. See Farley, supra, at 1001. However, over a 
period of several hundred years, that rivalry helped to shape the significant 
evolution of English common law. See Main, supra note 156, at 429 (Much of 
the grand history of Anglo-American law could be characterized as an epic 
struggle between the regimes of law and equity.). 
 160. Dan Dobbs distinguishes between two meanings of equity and equita-
ble. Thus, [o]ne group of ideas associated with the term equity suggests fair-
ness and moral quality. DOBBS, supra note 159, § 2.1(3), at 55. A second 
meaning refers simply to the body of precedent or practice or attitude of eq-
uity courts. Id. at 56. The latter governs the circumstances under which a 
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equitable in this more formal sense, a court would be power-
less to uphold the IRSs denial of a tax refund. This raises the 
central question of whether a tax-refund claim is a legal action  
or an equitable action.161 In the pivotal case of Stone v. White, 
the Supreme Court concluded that it partakes of elements of 
both.162 
A. STONE V. WHITE 
Stone v. White involved a testator, Mr. Stone, who left 
property in trust for his wife.163 As was her right, Mrs. Stone 
elected to receive the income from the trust instead of any 
dower or statutory interest to which she might have been enti-
tled.164 At the time, several circuit courts of appeals had held 
that dower rights given up in exchange for trust income were to 
be treated as payment for a deemed annuity.165 Thus, like in-
come from an annuity, trust income was not taxable to the 
beneficiary of the trust until the aggregate income payments 
received exceeded the amount deemed paid for the annuity.166 
Adhering to the decisions in the circuit court cases, Mrs. 
Stone did not report the income she received from the trust be-
cause it did not exceed the amount she was deemed to have 
 
plaintiff may pursue an equitable remedy. See id. 
 161. The American Colonies adopted the distinction between law and eq-
uity along with the English legal system. See John R. Kroger, Supreme Court 
Equity, 17891835, and the History of American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 
1425, 1438 (1998). The language of the U.S. Constitution is a historical testa-
ment to the distinction, which persisted formally until 1938. See U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the United 
States . . . . (emphasis added)). On Sept. 16, 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure became effective, thus merging law and equity in the federal courts. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (These rules govern the procedure in the United States 
district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law 
or in equity . . . . (emphasis added)); FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (There shall be one 
form of action to be known as civil action.); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 
539 (1970) (Under the Rules there is only one actiona civil actionin 
which all claims may be joined and all remedies are available.). Today, fed-
eral courts exercise both equitable and legal powers in adjudicating claims. 
 162. 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937). 
 163. Id. at 533. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See, e.g., Allen v. Brandeis, 29 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1928); United 
States v. Bolster, 26 F.2d 760, 763 (1st Cir. 1928); Warner v. Walsh, 15 F.2d 
367, 367 (2d Cir. 1926). 
 166. This treatment of annuity income ultimately was replaced in 1954 by 
§ 72. I.R.C. § 72 (West 2005). 
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paid for the annuity. Instead, the tax on the income was as-
sessed against, and paid by, the trust.167 After the statute of 
limitations had run for collecting the tax from Mrs. Stone, the 
Supreme Court in Helvering v. Butterworth, overruled the ear-
lier circuit court decisions and held that beneficiaries were in-
deed taxable on trust income.168 Relying on Butterworth, the 
trustees of the Stone trust sued to recover the tax that the trust 
had improperly paid.169 
The case appeared simple; the trust had paid income tax it 
did not owe and was therefore due a refund. Surprisingly, how-
ever, the Supreme Court denied the trusts refund claim.170 The 
Court recognized that if it granted the refund to the trust, no 
tax would be paid on the trusts income, since the statute of 
limitations barred collection of the tax from Mrs. Stone, the 
beneficiary who actually owed the tax under the Butterworth 
holding.171 Thus, the Court disregarded the separate entity 
status of Mrs. Stone and the trust, and treated Mrs. Stones ob-
ligation to pay the tax as though it were the obligation of the 
trust.172 
 
 167. Stone, 301 U.S. at 533. 
 168. 290 U.S. 365, 370 (1933) (When she makes her election the widow de-
cides to accept the benefits of the will with the accompanying rights and li-
abilities. In no proper sense does she purchase an annuity. For reasons satis-
factory to herself, she expresses a desire to occupy the position of a beneficiary 
and we think she should be so treated.). 
 169. Stone, 301 U.S. at 53334. 
 170. Id. at 535. 
 171. Id. at 536. 
 172. Id. at 537 ([A] court of equity takes cognizance of the identity in in-
terest of trustee and cestui que trust.). In this regard, the Courts decision re-
flected a judicial trend in the United States, beginning in the mid-1920s and 
continuing through the 1930s, of adopting a less formalistic approach to the 
interpretation of statutory provisions, particularly tax provisions. The most 
notable example of this trend is Judge Learned Hands decision in Helvering v. 
Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), decided just three years before Stone and 
subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 
465 (1935). In Gregory, the Court rejected the taxpayers attempt to reduce her 
tax burden with a tax scheme that was technically permissible but that lacked 
a valid business purpose. Id. at 470. Like the decision in Stone, Gregory re-
flected an assertion of purposive judgment over formalistic interpretation. The 
decisions in Stone and Gregory, however, were influenced by political, ideologi-
cal, and economic factors unique to the United States. A different set of factors 
was at work in Britain. In the 1930s, British courts took a path in adjudicating 
tax matters that was decidedly more formalistic than the approach adopted by 
U.S. courts. See Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Greg-
ory and the History of Tax Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 953, 
963 (2004). 
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Ignoring legal forms in this manner and collapsing the tax 
obligations of Mrs. Stone and the trust in order to reach a just 
outcome clearly was an exercise of equitable powers.173 How-
ever, the tax-refund suit brought by the trust, like the tax-
refund claims asserted by WorldCom and others, historically 
was a legal action rather than an equitable action, as the Court 
itself acknowledged.174 A principal tenet of equity was that an 
equitable remedy was not available to enforce a legal right.175 
How could the Court employ equity in what seemed clearly to 
be an action at law? 
B. EVOLUTION OF THE REFUND SUIT 
In answering that question, the Stone Court acknowledged 
that by virtue of its historical pedigree the tax-refund suit was 
a legal action; it was the lineal successor of the common law 
count indebitatus assumpsit.176 However, the Court noted that 
 
 173. The Court had no doubt about its authority to exercise equitable pow-
ers. See Stone, 301 U.S. at 53637 (noting that the Court was free to consider 
equitable rights and duties, and referring to the Court as a court of equity 
and as having equity powers). This Article is concerned with tax-refund 
suits, which may be brought only in one of the federal district courts or in the 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2000). The federal district 
courts were established under the powers granted to Congress by Article III of 
the U.S. Constitution. Thus, federal district courts may exercise equitable 
powers with respect to the resolution of tax-refund suits as a constitutional 
matter. Stone would appear to require the Court of Federal Claims, which is 
an Article I court, see 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2000), also to exercise equitable pow-
ers, at least to the extent of considering equitable defenses to tax refund suits. 
See Stone, 301 U.S. at 535; cf. Henry v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 795, 799800 
(1988) (considering and ultimately rejecting a taxpayers equitable estoppel 
claim on its merits). For an excellent treatment of the extent to which courts 
established under Article I (such as the Tax Court) may exercise equitable 
powers, see Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax 
Courts Exercise of Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 357, 375 
(2001). 
 174. See Stone, 301 U.S. at 536. 
 175. This is known as the adequacy of legal remedy or irreparable harm 
test, which traditionally permitted equitable relief only in cases where the 
available legal remedy was inadequate. There has been substantial debate in 
the last two decades about whether the rule actually is observed in practice by 
the courts, with many scholars having written its epitaph. See DOBBS, supra 
note 159, § 2.5(3), at 97 (The adequacy rule, as a rule that simply bars the 
gate, is virtually dead and probably should be.); Douglas Laycock, The Death 
of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 692 (1990) (I conclude 
that the irreparable injury rule is dead.). 
 176. Stone, 301 U.S. at 534 (The action, brought to recover a tax errone-
ously paid, although an action at law, is equitable in its function.) (emphasis 
added); cf. Yung F. Chiang, Payment by Mistake in English Law, 11 FLA. J. 
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the action had an equitable function.177 Indeed, a brief overview 
of the history of the indebitatus assumpsit action supports the 
courts assertion. 
First, equity had a significant effect on the origin of the as-
sumpsit action.178 The early English common law system rec-
ognized two actions that covered many of the contract-like obli-
gations that arose in the course of business and personal 
interactionsnamely, covenant and debt.179 Both covenant and 
debt actions suffered from infirmities that left them, like much 
of the common law system of writs, unavailable for the resolu-
tion of many disputes. For example, an action for covenant was 
the appropriate remedy for most breaches of promise, but cove-
nant could not be used for promises to pay money or to deliver 
goods. It also required a written document under seal, an ele-
ment that was frequently missing in many routine commercial 
transactions.180 An action for debt, on the other hand, which 
was available to recover amounts due creditors, did not require 
an obligation under seal.181 However, an action for debt applied 
only to amounts fixed at the time of the contract, and it could 
be defeated by wager of law.182 These considerations made debt 
a less than satisfactory remedy for breaches of promises to pay 
money. 
 
INTL L. 91, 9798 (1996) (In England, an action to recover payment for 
money had and received on the ground of mistake is within the jurisdiction of 
the court of law. Chancery, the equity court, never dealt with such action 
unless the plaintiff based the action on the fraud on the part of the defendant 
or unless the plaintiff, in an insolvency case, requested the court to distribute 
assets among claimants.). 
 177. Stone, 301 U.S. at 534. 
 178. Assumpsit means he undertook or he promised. Arthur A. Leff, The 
Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2082 (1985). 
 179. See James Oldham, Reinterpretations of 18th-Century English Con-
tract Theory: The View from Lord Mansfields Trial Notes, 76 GEO. L.J. 1949, 
195053 (1988). 
 180. See id. at 1951; Leff, supra note 178, at 2083. Thus, an action for cove-
nant was unavailable for a significant number of disputes involving breach of 
promise. 
 181. See Oldham, supra note 179, at 1952. 
 182. See Leff, supra note 178, at 2083. James Oldham describes wager of 
law as the ability of the defendant to wage his law by bringing to court a 
specified number of oath helpers, or compurgators, who, under oath, affirmed 
defendants position that no debt was owed. This wager of law automatically 
entitled the defendant to prevail. Oldham, supra note 179, at 1953 n.24 (cit-
ing A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 13744 
(1975)). Assumpsit actions originally were encouraged as a means of eliminat-
ing the defense of wager of law. See Moses v. Macferlan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 
676, 678 (K.B.). 
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The Court of Chancery stepped into the breach (so to 
speak) by providing equitable relief for certain broken promises 
and trade disputes.183 The law courts responded to the competi-
tion from the Court of Chancery by gradually expanding the 
writ system to include the writ in trespass, an action borrowed 
from tort law.184 The writ in trespass permitted a plaintiff to 
seek compensatory damages for some wrong done to him.185 
From the writ in trespass, the English common law eventually 
produced the assumpsit action, which by about 1400 had be-
come the basis for recovery for breach of contract.186 As dis-
cussed below, breach of contract is the action underlying tax-
refund suits. Thus, the very genesis of the action by which a tax 
refund may be claimed owes much to equity. 
Second, in the assumpsit action, which preceded the devel-
opment of the action for breach of contract, the plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant had made a promise that he failed to per-
form.187 Originally, assumpsit required an express promise, but 
the forces of equity influenced its development. Assumpsit ul-
timately came to be applied even where there was no explicit 
promise or contract.188 Where justice required that the plaintiff 
be granted relief, common law judges simply implied a promise 
and held the defendant liable on that promise.189 Thus, equity 
 
 183. See, e.g., S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON 
LAW 324 (2d ed. 1981). 
 184. See Oldham, supra note 179, at 1953 (discussing the shortcomings of 
debt and covenant, and observing that during the fifteenth century, Chancery 
began to intervene to fill the gaps, and, in jealous response, the law courts 
sought a means of expanding the writ system). 
 185. See David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the 
Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 69 (1996). 
 186. See DOBBS, supra note 159, § 4.2(1), at 38384; Oldham, supra note 
179, at 1955. As Oldham observes, It is one of the ironies of English legal his-
tory that the classical law of contracts emerged not from the medieval writs 
governing expectations of good faith . . . between individual persons but from 
trespass, a species of tort law. Oldham, supra note 179, at 1950 (citing J.H. 
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 263 (2d ed. 1979)). 
 187. Assumpsit was a legal action, but like its predecessor the writ in tres-
pass, it evolved because the law courts desired to compete with the Court of 
Chancery by becoming more equitable. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 122 
(6th ed. 1990); Keeton, supra note 32, at 3940 (describing how the law courts 
expanded their powers based on a rivalry with the Court of Chancery). 
 188. See J.B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 53, 54, 58 
(1888) (discussing the decline of the explicit promise requirement of assump-
sit actions). 
 189. See DOBBS, supra note 159, § 4.2(1), at 383 (Sometimes the contract 
would be express, sometimes implied by the parties actions, but in either 
event a genuine contract.). Assumpsit actions not only were sustained on the 
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affected the development of assumpsit again, permitting an ac-
tion for breach of contract where a formal contract or promise 
was not present. 
Third, in some circumstances, an assumpsit action involved 
the breach of a promise to pay an antecedent debt.190 Here 
again, equity was influential, as the antecedent debt itself 
came to be implied based on notions of fairness.191 Thus evolved 
the indebitatus assumpsit action,192 which became the form of 
assumpsit used for breach of an implied promise to repay an 
antecedent debt where that debt was itself implied based on 
notions of fairness and equity.193 
 
basis of implied promises or contracts; they often were maintained in the ab-
sence of any contract, implied or otherwise. Id. Again, the critical element in 
such cases was the necessity to render justice in the face of an inflexible legal 
form. As Dobbs has observed, the assumpsit action also came to be used when 
the parties had no contract at all, so long as the plaintiff could convince the 
court that he ought to recover something from the defendant as a matter of jus-
tice or good conscience. Id. (emphasis added). 
 190. In Slades Case, (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B.), failure to perform 
was expanded to include the failure to pay over money owed, a type of nonfea-
sance that previously could be remedied only by an action in debt. See Old-
ham, supra note 179, at 1957. 
 191. See Clinton W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial Administration and 
the Development of Contract Law in Seventeenth-Century England, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 35, 110 (1983) (The defendants undertaking in indebitatus counts 
was expressed as a subsequent promise to pay for an antecedent debt, an ex-
pression that in most instances was probably entirely fictional. The common 
law courts, recognizing the value of the indebitatus count as an expeditious 
remedy, promoted its use, while turning a blind eye to the fictional averment 
of a subsequent promise.). The seminal case on this point is Moses v. Macfer-
lan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.), in which the plaintiff, Moses, had en-
dorsed certain notes to Macferlan, who agreed to indemnify Moses on the en-
dorsements. Id. at 676. Notwithstanding his agreement, Macferlan later sued 
Moses on his endorsements. Id. The court refused to hear evidence of Macfer-
lans agreement to indemnify Moses, and Macferlan prevailed. Id. Moses then 
sought to recover the judgment awarded to Macferlan in an indebitatus as-
sumpsit action. Id. at 677. In granting relief to Moses, Lord Mansfield, the 
Chief Justice of the Court of Kings Bench, described the implied debt and 
promise as follows: If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of 
natural justice, to refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this action, 
founded in the equity of the plaintiff s case, as it were upon a contract. Id. at 
678 (emphasis added). In other words, because under principles of natural jus-
tice Macferlan had an obligation to indemnify Moses in accordance with his 
agreement, the court implied a debt from Macferlan to Moses. This implied 
debt carried with it an assumpsit or promise by Macferlan to pay the indem-
nity amount, a promise that Macferlan broke when he recovered the indem-
nity amount from Moses in the earlier action. 
 192. Indebitatus assumpsit means being indebted he undertook or prom-
ised. Leff, supra note 178, at 2083. 
 193. Indebitatus assumpsit would only lie for breach of a duty to pay 
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Finally, equity also affected the later extension of the in-
debitatus assumpsit action to apply not only to contracts or 
promises implied in fact, but also to contracts implied in law, or 
quasi-contracts.194 This led to the use of indebitatus assump-
sit to obtain refunds of taxes that had been illegally or errone-
ously collected.195 As pleading became standardized in the sev-
enteenth century, certain common counts arose under 
indebitatus assumpsit, one of which, the count for money had 
and received to the plaintiff s use, became the basis of the 
modern tax-refund suit.196 
The Court in Stone concluded that, based on its close his-
torical relationship to equity, a tax-refund suit brought to re-
cover a tax erroneously paid, although an action at law, is equi-
table in its function.197 The court noted that the indebitatus 
assumpsit action had long been used to recover on rights of an 
equitable nature and that such suits were invariably controlled 
by equitable principles.198 Based on this pedigree, the Stone 
court was free to do equity and deny the trustees claim for re-
fund.199 
C. EQUITABLE DEFENSES TO REFUND SUITS 
The most critical implication of the equitable status of a 
tax-refund suit is that the action may be defended in equity.200 
In Stone, the Supreme Court held, since, in [a tax-refund] ac-
tion, the plaintiff must recover by virtue of a right measured by 
 
money. Ames, supra note 188, at 64. 
 194. Id. at 6566. 
 195. See id. (citing City of London v. Goree, (1677) 86 Eng. Rep. 192 (K.B.) 
(involving an assumpsit action to recover money due by custom)); cf. Leff, su-
pra note 178, at 2083 (discussing the evolution of indebitatus assumpsit). 
 196. See Estate of Mueller v. Commr, 153 F.3d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937)). 
 197. Stone, 301 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added). 
 198. Id.; see also United States v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 291 U.S. 386, 40203 
(1933) ([The assumpsit action] is often called an equitable action and is less 
restricted and fettered by technical rules and formalities than any other form 
of action . . . . It approaches nearer to a bill in equity than any other common 
law action.); Champ Spring Co. v. United States, 47 F.2d 1, 3 (8th Cir. 1931) 
(While [the tax-refund suit] is an action at law, it is nevertheless governed by 
equitable principles.). 
 199. Stone, 301 U.S. at 537 ([T]he fact that the petitioners and their bene-
ficiary must be regarded as distinct legal entities for purposes of the assess-
ment and collection of taxes does not deprive the court of its equity powers or 
alter the equitable principles which govern the type of action which petitioners 
have chosen for the assertion of their claim.). 
 200. See DOBBS, supra note 159, § 2.1(3), at 57. 
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equitable standards, it follows that it is open to the defendant 
to show any state of facts which, according to those standards, 
would deny the right.201 Similarly, in a case decided the same 
day as Stone, the Supreme Court held that a tax-refund suit 
permits the Commissioner to secure a final adjudication of his 
right to withhold the overpayment . . . on the ground that other 
taxes are due from the taxpayer, or that upon other grounds he  
is not equitably entitled to the refund.202 Thus, in a refund suit, 
the IRS has the entire range of equitable defenses at its dis-
posal. 
Equity is grounded in a rich tradition of equitable max-
ims.203 The various equitable defenses that populate federal 
case law are derived from those maxims.204 Given the proce-
dural posture of refund claims for taxes paid on fraudulently 
inflated earnings, not all equitable defenses would be applica-
ble.205 Three equitable defenses, however, seem particularly 
 
 201. Stone, 301 U.S. at 535 (emphasis added); see also Davis v. United 
States, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 13,195, at 87,274 (D. Tex. 1977) (The Su-
preme Court [in Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932)] . . . felt that an 
action for refund was an equitable action . . . and therefore equitable defenses 
should also apply.). 
 202. United States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 543 
(1937) (emphasis added); see also Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932) 
(holding that even where a statute of limitations bars assessment and collec-
tion of additional tax, the government may retain payments already received if 
such amounts might have been properly assessed and collected). 
 203. In his seminal book on equity, Keeton lists thirteen such maxims. See 
KEETON, supra note 32, at 89. 
 204. For example, the equitable maxim, He who comes into Equity must 
come with clean hands, is the basis for the doctrine of unclean hands. See 
KEETON, supra note 32, at 87117 (discussing equitable defenses). Similarly, 
the equitable maxim Delay defeats equities gave rise to the doctrine of la-
ches. See id. 
 205. The more important equitable defenses include the following: (1) Equi-
table Tolling permits a plaintiff to file suit after the running of the statute of 
limitations if, despite diligent effort, she cannot determine whether she has a 
viable claim. See Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset v. Commr, 165 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 
1999). (2) Equitable Estoppel precludes one party from asserting a claim 
against another party who has detrimentally altered her position in reliance 
on the first partys misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. See 
Kennedy v. United States, 965 F.2d 413, 418 (7th Cir. 1992). (3) Equitable Re-
coupment allows a taxpayer to recoup or offset previously overpaid taxes 
against current taxes where the statute of limitations on a refund claim has 
run, if the two taxes arose out of the same transaction and were assessed on 
inconsistent legal theories. See Estate of Branson v. Commr, 264 F.3d 904, 
909 (9th Cir. 2001). (4) Doctrine of Laches denies relief where the defendant 
has been prejudiced by the plaintiff s failure to diligently prosecute his claim. 
See Zelazny v. Lyng, 853 F.2d 540, 541 (7th Cir. 1988). (5) Quasi-Estoppel, like 
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apposite to claims for refunds of tax paid on fraudulently in-
flated earnings: the doctrine of unclean hands, equitable estop-
pel, and quasi-estoppel. 
1. The Doctrine of Unclean Hands 
One of the most familiar equitable maxims is that one who 
comes into equity must come with clean hands. The maxim is 
more than a mere banality; it is the underpinning of the doc-
trine of unclean hands, which may be an absolute bar to recov-
ery in a tax-refund suit.206 The Supreme Court has described 
the doctrine as an ordinance that closes the doors of a court of 
equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative 
to the matter in which he seeks relief.207 The doctrine is rooted 
in the historical notion of the court of equity as a vehicle for af-
firmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good 
faith.208 Under the unclean hands doctrine, a court sitting in 
equity has wide-ranging discretion in refusing to aid the un-
clean litigant, and it is not bound by formula or restrained by 
any limitation that tends to trammel the free and just exercise 
of discretion.209 
The essence of the doctrine is the denial of equitable relief 
to a plaintiff who commits a wrong in the same transaction in 
which he claims to have been injured.210 For example, in Preci-
sion Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance 
 
equitable estoppel, precludes a plaintiff from asserting a claim against a de-
fendant, where the plaintiff has taken inconsistent positions, but does not re-
quire misrepresentation or concealment by the plaintiff or detrimental reli-
ance by the defendant. See Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc. v. Dworkin, 919 F.2d 
368, 371 (5th Cir. 1990). (6) Doctrine of Unclean Hands prevents relief to a 
plaintiff who is a wrongdoer in the same transaction in which he claims to 
have been injured. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. 
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945). (7) Unjust Enrichment prevents a defendant 
from retaining a benefit which has come to her at the expense of the plaintiff. 
See Vanacore v. Kennedy, 86 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (D. Conn. 1998). (8) Promis-
sory Estoppel enforces a promise made without consideration if the promisee 
detrimentally relied on the promise and such reliance could reasonably have 
been expected by the promisor. See Schonholz v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 
87 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 206. Lampenfield v. Internal Revenue Serv., 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 50,038, at 87,161, 87,166 (W.D. Pa. 1991). 
 207. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814. 
 208. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc., 
291 F.2d 471, 474 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 209. Lampenfield, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), at 87,161, 87,166 (discussing 
Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 24546 (1933)). 
 210. Smith v. World Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1462 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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Machinery Co., the plaintiff sought to enforce a contract involv-
ing certain patents that it knew were fraudulent at the time 
the contract was executed.211 The Supreme Court declined to 
enforce the contract, holding that the plaintiff s conduct in fail-
ing to disclose the patent fraud to the U.S. Patent Office did not 
conform to minimum ethical standards and [did] not justify 
[plaintiff]s . . . attempt to assert and enforce . . . perjury-
tainted patents and contracts.212 
It is not necessary that the misconduct giving rise to appli-
cation of the doctrine be punishable as a crime or otherwise be 
legally actionable.213 Any willful act transgressing equitable 
standards of conduct is sufficient cause for invocation of the 
doctrine, as the language of the Court in Precision Instrument 
suggests.214 By the same token, the doctrine of unclean hands 
clearly applies where the plaintiff s act consists of a direct vio-
lation of a statute.215 In addition, the equitable or statutory vio-
lation must be closely related to the matter being litigated. 
Courts will apply the doctrine only where the plaintiff s act in 
some measure affects the equitable relations between the par-
ties regarding the issue brought before the court for adjudica-
tion.216 Although the broad form of the conduct standard217 is 
sufficient to constitute unclean hands, it could raise thorny 
questions as to the scope of minimum ethical standards. 
Therefore, this Article proposes adopting a narrow form of the 
conduct standard. In other words, a refund claim would be 
summarily denied only if the taxpayer had directly violated a 
statute connected with the matter in litigation. 
 
 211. 324 U.S. 806, 81820 (1945). 
 212. Id. at 816 (emphasis added). 
 213. See N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 291 F.2d at 474. 
 214. 324 U.S. at 815; see also N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 291 F.2d at 474. 
 215. See Metro Motors v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 339 F.3d 746, 750
51 (8th Cir. 2003) (Well-accepted general principles of equity support [plain-
tiff s] contention that a statutory violation gives a party unclean hands.); In 
re Estate of Bruner, 338 F.3d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 2003) (unlawful or inequi-
table conduct, defrauding the government); Promac, Inc. v. West, 203 F.3d 
786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (violation of federal regulations); Smith v. World Ins. 
Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1463 (8th Cir. 1994) ([E]quity, under the general maxim 
that one who seeks equity must come with clean hands, will refuse its aid to a 
litigant who violates a statute directly connected with the matter in litiga-
tion.); Intercorp, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., No. 86-G-0911-S, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12041, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 30, 1987) (illegal conduct). 
 216. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 
(1933). 
 217.  See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, an important consideration in the application of 
the doctrine of unclean hands, and indeed, in the application of 
all of the equitable defenses, is the resulting effect on public 
policy.218 When a suit in equity relates to the public interest, 
the doctrine of unclean hands assumes wider and more signifi-
cant proportions because application of the doctrine to deny re-
lief not only resolves a private injustice, it also has the poten-
tial to avert an injury to the public.219 For example, in Precision 
Instrument, the Supreme Court observed that the possession 
and assertion of patent rights were issues of great moment to 
the public and assessed the claims at issue against public, as 
well as private, standards of equity.220 Therefore, the Courts 
ultimate refusal to enforce the plaintiff s patent claims sup-
ported the public interest in seeing that patents, and the mo-
nopolies inherent in them, be limited to their proper scope and 
be granted in an environment free of fraudulent conduct.221 
In a situation like WorldComs, each of the requisite ele-
ments of the doctrine of unclean hands is present. WorldCom 
sought equitable relief in the form of a refund of excess taxes 
paid.222 However, the company committed a wrong in the very 
transaction in which it claims to have been injured, the para-
digm case for application of the doctrine of unclean hands. 
WorldCom directly violated § 7206,223 and thus satisfies the 
narrow form of the conduct standard. There is no need to in-
quire into whether WorldCom also breached standards of ethi-
cal conduct, although it clearly did. 
The WorldCom situation also meets the requirement that 
the doctrine of unclean hands be applied only where the plain-
tiff s act (here, the violation of § 7206) is closely related to the 
matter being litigated. Had WorldCom not filed fraudulent tax 
returns for the years in question in violation of § 7206, no ex-
cess tax would have been paid, and there would be no need for 
the company to commence litigation to obtain a tax refund.  
 
 
 218. Public policy is discussed here as a consideration in the traditional 
equitable defenses. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of public policy as a 
free-standing, equity-flavored doctrine. 
 219. See Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 816; Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger 
Co., 314 U.S. 488, 49294 (1942); N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 291 F.2d at 474. 
 220. 324 U.S. at 816 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire 
Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 221. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 816. 
 222. See Blumenstein et al., supra note 15. 
 223. I.R.C. § 7206 (2000). 
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Thus, WorldComs fraud measurably affect[s] the equitable re-
lations between the parties regarding the tax-refund claim.224 
Denying WorldComs equitable claim for a tax refund in 
such circumstances also comports with the public policy aspect 
of the unclean hands doctrine. The integrity and accuracy of all 
federal income tax returns is no less important to the public 
than the possession and assertion of patent rights, which the 
Court in Precision Instrument held to be of great moment to 
the public.225 Courts have frequently noted the strong public 
policy interest in the accurate reporting of income.226 
2. Equitable Estoppel 
Estoppel is a term used widely in the law, which, in its 
most general sense, refers to the situation in which a party is 
precluded or stopped from taking some action or making some 
argument or claim.227 The preclusion may result from a prior, 
overriding rule or claim, or, as in the case of equitable estop-
pel, it may result from considerations of fairness and justice.228 
Thus, the doctrine of unclean hands discussed in the previous 
section is a species of equitable estoppel, precluding equitable 
relief where the party seeking it has done wrong in the particu-
lar transaction. The doctrine is rooted in concerns of public pol-
icy, fair dealing, common honesty, good faith, and justice.229 
Equitable estoppel differs from the unclean hands doctrine 
in that it prevents a party from asserting a claim against an-
other party who has detrimentally altered her position in reli-
 
 224. Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933). 
 225. 324 U.S. at 81516 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 246 
(internal quotations omitted)); see also Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 
U.S. 488, 49294 (1942). 
 226. See supra notes 11721 and accompanying text. 
 227. See DOBBS, supra note 159, § 2.3(5), at 6465. 
 228. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984) (Estoppel 
is an equitable doctrine invoked to avoid injustice in particular cases.); 
Readco, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 81 F.3d 295, 301 (2d Cir. 1996) (Equi-
table estoppel is imposed by law in the interest of fairness to prevent the en-
forcement of rights which would work fraud or injustice upon the person 
against whom enforcement is sought and who, in justifiable reliance upon the 
opposing partys words or conduct, has been misled into acting upon the belief 
that such enforcement would not be sought.); Melrose Assocs., L.P. v. United 
States, 43 Fed. Cl. 124, 147 (Ct. Cl. 1999) (The doctrine of equitable estoppel 
is a judicial remedy by which a party may be precluded by its own act or omis-
sion, from asserting a right to which it otherwise would have been entitled.). 
 229. E.g., Hilco Prop. Servs. v. United States, 929 F. Supp. 526, 539 (D. 
N.H. 1996). 
BOISE_3FMT 11/22/2005 04:30:44 PM 
2005] PLAYING WITH MONOPOLY MONEY 193 
 
ance on the first partys misrepresentation.230 Where the ele-
ments of equitable estoppel apply, a party is absolutely barred 
from asserting a right that under other circumstances would be 
indisputable.231 In this way, a party is prevented from taking 
unconscionable advantage of her own wrong by asserting her 
strict legal rights.232 
The elements of equitable estoppel vary somewhat from 
court to court, but the oft-cited list in the Sixth Circuits opin-
ion in Armistead v. Vernitron Corp. is representative, and in-
cludes the following: 
(1) conduct or language amounting to a representation of material 
fact; (2) awareness of the true facts by the party to be estopped; (3) an 
intention on the part of the party to be estopped that the representa-
tion be acted on, or conduct toward the party asserting the estoppel 
such that the latter has a right to believe that the formers conduct is 
so intended; (4) unawareness of the true facts by the party asserting 
the estoppel; and (5) detrimental and justifiable reliance on the repre-
sentation by the party asserting estoppel.233 
In addition to these elements, there are some additional 
considerations in the application of the doctrine of equitable es-
toppel. Most importantly for its application to tax-refund 
claims, the doctrine is available for both legal and equitable 
claims.234 Whereas the doctrine of unclean hands applies to eq-
uitable or equity-like actions, equitable estoppel is subject to no  
 
 
 230. Kennedy v. United States, 965 F.2d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1992); see also 
Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 725 (2d Cir. 
2001); Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 231. Hilco Prop. Servs., 929 F. Supp. at 540 (stating that equitable estoppel 
prevents the assertion of what would otherwise be an unequivocal right) 
(quoting 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 33 (1966)). 
 232. Plymouth Foam Prods. v. City of Becker, 120 F.3d 153, 157 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
 233. Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1298 (6th Cir. 1991); see 
also Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 101617 (9th Cir. 1998); Bur-
dine v. Dow Chemical Co., 923 F.2d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Arkan-
sas law); Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1167 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(adopting elements listed in the Ninth Circuits decision in TRW, Inc. v. Fed-
eral Trade Comm., 647 F.2d 942, 95051 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 234. See Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 1987) (The 
federal doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to actions brought in federal 
courts at law and equity. (citing Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 
231, 23233 (1959))); DOBBS, supra note 159, § 2.3(5), at 66 (Equitable estop-
pel originated in decisions of equity courts, as its name implies; but it has long 
since worked over into law. This means that estoppel, when established, af-
fects not only equitable remedies, but also legal remedies.). 
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such limitations.235 Thus, it may be raised as a defense to tax-
refund claims without relying on the historically equitable na-
ture of such claims. 
Another consideration in the application of equitable es-
toppel is that it should operate always as a shield and never as 
a sword.236 In other words, equitable estoppel does not work as 
a positive gain to a party,237 but rather serves to prevent a loss 
that otherwise would occur by strict application of the law.238 It  
should not be applied beyond what is necessary to promote the 
ends of justice and accomplish that which ought to be done 
between [the parties].239 
The first four elements of equitable estoppel as enumer-
ated by the Sixth Circuit in Armistead v. Vernitron Corp. are 
clearly satisfied in a tax-refund situation like that of World-
Coms. WorldCom made a representation on its federal income 
tax return of a material factits taxable incomewhile being 
aware that its true income was in fact much less.240 World-
Coms false representation of its income on a document exe-
cuted under penalty of perjury was conduct calculated to induce 
the IRS to act by accepting the income tax return as a true 
and accurate statement of its income and tax liability, and 
foregoing enforcement action for failure to file a correct tax re-
turn.241 Of course, the IRS was unaware of WorldComs true in-
come, since the federal income tax system relies on taxpayers to 
apprise the government of their tax obligations through self-
reporting. 
The fifth element of equitable estoppel is detrimental reli-
ance by the party asserting the estoppel. The case law in this 
area requires detriment, injury, or prejudice to the party claim-
ing the estoppel.242 Moreover, the prejudice or injury involved 
 
 235. DOBBS, supra note 159, § 2.3(5), at 66. 
 236. E.g., Lacy v. United States, 216 F.2d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 1954); Arnold 
& Assocs., Inc. v. Misys Healthcare Sys., 275 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1023 (D. Ariz. 
2003). 
 237. G.S. Johnson Co. v. Nev. Packard Mines Co., 272 F. 291, 309 (D. Nev. 
1920). 
 238. The Tampico v. Crossett W. Lumber Co., 270 F. 537, 542 (9th Cir. 
1921). 
 239. Cook v. Ball, 144 F.2d 423, 438 (7th Cir. 1944). 
 240. See supra notes 1618 and accompanying text. 
 241. See United States v. Rayor, 204 F. Supp. 486, 492 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (ob-
serving that the government has a right to believe, before acting on a return, 
that the return truthfully reflects the taxpayers income and expenditures). 
 242. Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1167 (7th Cir. 1982) (quot-
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must be actual and material or substantial, and not merely 
technical or formal.243 In WorldComs case, the IRS clearly re-
lied on the false representations contained in the companys tax 
return. The question is whether there was a corresponding det-
riment to the IRS since there was an overpayment of tax rather 
than a tax deficiency.244 As discussed in Part II.B, the courts 
have answered that question affirmatively.245 In Badaracco246 
and Goldman,247 the courts discussed the specific detriment to 
the government caused by the filing of false returns, including 
increasing its administrative burdens, hindering the verifica-
tion of the taxpayers correct tax liability, and undermining 
voluntary compliance. These are actual rather than merely 
technical harms, and they should be sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Moreover, 
because estoppel in this situation would redress actual harms 
to the government, its function would be that of a shield rather 
than a sword. 
In sum, equitable estoppel presents a viable defense that 
the government may assert to deny a refund claim where tax 
fraud is involved. Unlike the defense of unclean hands, it may 
be raised as a defense against legal as well as equitable claims. 
However, the need to establish detrimental reliance makes it 
somewhat weaker than the unclean hands defense. 
3. Quasi-Estoppel 
Closely related to equitable estoppel is the doctrine of 
quasi-estoppel, sometimes referred to as the duty of consis-
tency.248 This doctrine precludes a party from asserting, to an-
others disadvantage, a right that is inconsistent with a posi-
tion he has previously taken. The doctrine applies when it 
would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a posi-
tion inconsistent with one to which he acquiesced, or from 
which he accepted a benefit.249 In general, the elements of 
 
ing United States v. Fox Lake State Bank, 366 F.2d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1966)) 
(requiring substantial injury from reliance). 
 243. See 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 78 (1966). 
 244. Of course, in the circumstances addressed by this Article there never 
would be a tax deficiency, since a tax deficiency would not give rise to either a 
refund claim or a need to deny that claim on grounds of equity. 
 245. See supra notes 10013 and accompanying text. 
 246. Badaracco v. Commr, 464 U.S. 386, 398400 (1984). 
 247. United States v. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. 337, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
 248. Estate of Letts v. Commr, 109 T.C. 290, 296 (1997). 
 249. Stinnett v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 227 F.3d 247, 258 (5th Cir. 2000); 
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quasi-estoppel are (1) a partys taking of a position and the ac-
ceptance of the benefits of that position, and (2) the partys sub-
sequent taking of an inconsistent position to avoid correspond-
ing obligations or effects of the initial position.250 In tax cases, 
courts sometimes have included the additional element of an 
expired statute of limitations. Thus, in Beltzer v. United States, 
the elements were: 
(1) the taxpayer has made a representation or reported an item for 
tax purposes in one year, (2) the Commissioner has acquiesced in or 
relied on that fact for that year, and (3) the taxpayer desires to 
change the representation, previously made, in a later year after the 
statute of limitations on assessments bars adjustments for the initial 
tax year.251 
The third element in the latter formulation highlights the 
situation where inconsistent positions would permit a taxpayer 
to whipsaw the IRS.252 
Beltzer v. United States provides an example of the applica-
tion of quasi-estoppel in the tax context. In that case, the tax-
payer inherited shares of stock that had been undervalued on 
 
see also Long v. Turner, 134 F.3d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 1998). A critical difference 
between equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel is that the latter does not re-
quire a showing of either a misrepresentation by one party or reliance on that 
misrepresentation by the other party. Long, 134 F.3d at 318. 
 250. E.g., VT, Inc. v. Geico Ins. Co., No. 3:03-CV-0522-P, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11849, at *24 (N.D. Tex. June 16, 2004); see also Alamo Natl Bank v. 
Commr, 95 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1938). 
 251. 495 F.2d 211, 212 (8th Cir. 1974); see also Griffith v. United States, 
71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9280, at 86,084 (N.D. Tex. 1971); Harvey & 
McMillan v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9720, at 93,838 (S.D. 
W. Va. 1964); Estate of Letts, 109 T.C. at 296 (1997). 
 252. The Fifth Circuit discussed the whipsaw dilemma as follows: 
In income taxation what is done in one tax year is sometimes pro-
jected into another where the same fact must govern. There being 
continuity, there ought to be consistency in treatment. If, for instance, 
a sale is made on deferred payments, and the taxpayer returns it as 
an installment sale, charging himself only with the cash collection, 
and the Commissioner acquiesces, the taxpayer could not in later 
years refuse to pay on the deferred collections by asserting that he 
stated the facts wrongly in the first instance and ought to have paid 
on all then, unless he should offer to correct also the first tax settle-
ment. So if a taxpayer who acquired gain in an exchange of property 
sets up as its measure a value of what he received in which the Com-
missioner acquiesces, that value is the basis to be taken in measuring 
a further gain on a sale of the property in a later year. The taxpayer 
cannot say: I was mistaken. The value was many times what I said it 
was. I therefore realized less gain on the last sale, without doing jus-
tice all around in correcting his mistake. 
Alamo Natl Bank, 95 F.2d at 623. 
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the decedents estate tax return.253 When the taxpayer sold the 
shares several years later for an amount considerably greater 
than the value reflected in the estate tax return, he argued that 
his adjusted basis in the shares, for purposes of calculating the 
capital gain on the sale, should have been greater than the 
value reflected in the estate tax return.254 The higher basis 
would have reduced the tax paid on the sale, for which the tax-
payer sought a refund.255 The IRS invoked the doctrine of 
quasi-estoppel to deny the taxpayers refund claim and the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the governments position, holding that 
the taxpayer could not assign stock a low value for purposes of 
determining the estate tax due, and later, when the statute of 
limitations had run on the collection of the estate tax, change 
that value so as to reduce the amount of capital gains tax due 
on the sale of the stock.256 
Quasi-estoppel, although presenting fewer requirements 
for its application, is a bit more awkward to employ in the case 
of refund claims for fraudulently inflated income tax than the 
doctrines of unclean hands or equitable estoppel, at least as the 
doctrine has developed in the area of tax law. The fraudulent 
inflation of ones tax liability is counterintuitive and as a result, 
the relevant statutes and legal doctrines are ill-suited to deal 
with such cases.257 Nevertheless, quasi-estoppel offers the IRS 
yet another possible equitable defense to payment of refund 
claims in cases such as WorldComs. 
First, the Commissioner relied on WorldComs assertion 
that its income was some $11 billion more than it really was.258 
Although this position cost the company additional taxes, it 
permitted WorldCom to represent to its investors that it was 
thriving when, in fact, it was teetering on the edge of financial 
ruin. This benefit clearly had monetary value to the company 
measured by the amount of the taxes that it paid.259 WorldCom 
subsequently sought to change the representation that it had 
previously made (namely, that its income was $11 billion more 
 
 253. Beltzer, 495 F.2d at 212. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 21213. For a similar case, see Alamo Natl Bank, 95 F.2d at 
623. 
 257. See, e.g., supra note 81 and accompanying text (regarding I.R.C. 
§ 6663 (2000)). 
 258. See Young, supra note 17. 
 259. See Erickson et al., supra note 61, at 388, 391. 
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than it actually was) so as to avoid the consequences of that 
earlier position (namely, the permanent loss of the taxes paid 
on the inflated income). All that is missing is an expired statute 
of limitations. This should not be fatal, however. As noted 
above, the expired statute of limitations element simply de-
scribes one situation in the tax law in which the IRS potentially 
may be whipsawed and where the application of quasi-estoppel 
is particularly apposite.260 The benefit WorldCom enjoyed, 
unlike a reduction in taxes, does not become fixed upon the ex-
piration of a statute of limitations. Moreover, the two elements 
of the traditional version of quasi-estoppel would be satisfied, 
and there does not appear to be any authority that suggests the 
tax version must be used exclusively in tax-related cases. 
In short, to successfully assert the equitable defense of 
quasi-estoppel to WorldComs tax-refund claim, the IRS would 
need only show that WorldCom benefited from the position it 
took on its federal income tax returns, and that it now seeks to 
change that position in order to avoid the consequences it en-
tails.261 Given the facts of the case, such a showing is easily 
made. 
D. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 
As noted in the preceding discussion of the various equita-
ble defenses, a primary concern of equity is public policy.262 
That is, does public policy demand the application of the par-
ticular equitable defense, and if that defense is applied, what 
will be the effect on public policy? But apart from its relation-
ship to specific equitable defenses, public policy presents 
broader issues that may affect the use of equity as proposed in 
this Article. Some of these issues are addressed under the three 
broad headings in the remainder of this Part III. 
1. Rules v. Standards 
The history of the development of equity, as described in 
Part III.B, reflects the ongoing tension between judge-made law 
(equity) on the one hand, and statutory rules (common law) on 
the other. While the tax law does not want for statutory rules, 
 
 260. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 261. Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc. v. Dworkin, 919 F.2d 368, 371 (5th Cir. 
1990) (explaining that to establish quasi-estoppel, one must show that the 
party to be estopped can be equitably charged with choosing to accept benefits 
in a manner genuinely inconsistent with his subsequent claim). 
 262. See supra notes 21821 and accompanying text. 
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it has been significantly shaped by judge-made law.263 For ex-
ample, in the 1930s it was a judicial move away from formalism 
in the tax law that culminated in the Supreme Courts decision 
in Gregory v. Helvering.264 In that case, the court first articu-
lated the business purpose doctrine, a standard that permits 
the denial of favored tax treatment for transactions that lack 
sufficient business purpose.265 An equally influential judge-
made standard was articulated four decades later by the Su-
preme Court in Knetsch v. United States.266 That standard, the 
well-known economic substance doctrine, permits a transac-
tion to be disregarded if there is no economic substance to the 
transaction beyond the tax benefit sought.267 
Although the debate is not over, where tax law is con-
cerned, standards such as these are seen by some scholars as 
superior to rules in many respects.268 The principal reason is 
that standards do not require frequent amendment to adapt to 
incremental change.269 This view has been reinforced recently 
 
 263. See Likhovski, supra note 172, at 980. 
 264. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).  
 265. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469 (describing the purported corporate reorgani-
zation in the case as [s]imply an operation having no business or corporate 
purposea mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as 
a disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole object and accom-
plishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reor-
ganize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corpo-
rate shares to the petitioner). 
 266. 364 U.S. 361 (1960). 
 267. Id. at 366. 
 268. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 57 
(1990) (A society in as much [legal] ferment as ours needs a mechanism for 
legal change, and it is not obvious that the combination that predominates in 
federal income taxationextremely detailed statutory specifications with fre-
quent amendments and continuous executive rule makingis always to be 
preferred to judicial administration of flexible standards.); David A. Weis-
bach, Costs of Departures from Formalism: Formalism in Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 860, 860 (1999) ([O]ver the last several years, the purely rule-oriented 
approach to the tax law has begun to be perceived as a failure.). But see Louis 
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992) (arguing that if cases are anticipated to arise frequently and have im-
portant recurring characteristics, as is the case with tax law, rules will not 
only be preferable, but might be expected to be more precise). 
 269. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 590 (5th ed. 
1998) (To control behavior through a set of detailed rules rather than through 
a general standard involves costs . . . in revising the rules to keep them 
abreast of changing conditions; as we have noted, a specific rule will obsolesce 
more rapidly than a general standard.); Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and 
the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673 (1969) (recognizing, over three decades ago, the 
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in assessing the problem of abusive corporate tax shelters.270 
Attempts to shut down tax shelters with rules simply result in 
new avoidance maneuvers, which in turn require additional 
rules that are again exploited, and so on.271 An anti-avoidance 
standard, by contrast, is adaptable to transactions as they mu-
tate.272 To illustrate with an example, following the Knetsch de-
cision,273 Congress enacted a rule to prevent the transaction 
employed by Knetschnamely, the deduction of interest paid 
in connection with tax-deferred annuities.274 The rule was ef-
fective for that transaction but, unlike the economic substance 
standard articulated by the Court, was useless in addressing 
subsequent variations of the transaction, such as corporate-
owned life insurance, which surfaced in the early 1990s. 
The point here is that the use of equitable defenses as a 
means of denying tax-refund claims in earnings-inflation cases, 
like the use of standards in other contexts, may well be prefer-
able to a legislative enactment that would increase the penalty 
applicable to fraudulent returns.275 In the particular context of 
§ 7206,276 equitable defenses would share with the legislative 
approach the advantages of addressing the overpayment issue 
not contemplated by the original penalty and of imposing a 
penalty that would not likely become obsolete by virtue of infla-
tion or similar factors.277 Unlike the legislative solution, how-
ever, equitable defenses would not be susceptible to obsoles-
cence as tax fraud evolves. 
 
value of standards in managing the complexity of tax law). 
 270. David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 
215, 24748 (2002). 
 271. See Surrey, supra note 269, at 686 ([R]ules in turn bring about new 
frontiers of interpretation and maneuver, which are settled by new statutory 
rules, again creating new frontiers. The tax universe is indeed limitless, with 
no frontier ever providing a finite boundary.). 
 272. There have been several attempts to codify the economic substance 
doctrine, most recently in the Senates version of the legislation that became 
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. The economic substance provision, 
along with the increased penalty that would cover tax fraud involving over-
statements of income, was dropped in conference. Compare S. 1637, 108th 
Cong. § 425 (2004) with American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
357, 118 Stat. 1418. 
 273. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). 
 274. I.R.C. § 264(a)(4) (2000). 
 275. See supra notes 2428 and accompanying text (discussing efforts by 
the Senate to increase fraudulent overpayment penalties). 
 276. I.R.C. § 7206 (2000). 
 277. See supra notes 12228 and accompanying text (discussing penalty 
amounts). 
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One trade-off in adopting standards over rules is the di-
minished certainty that accompanies vaguer, judge-made 
law.278 The use of equitable defenses in denying a fraud-related 
refund claim in a case like WorldComs, for example, would es-
tablish a new precedent. It would initially create some uncer-
tainty as taxpayers evaluate whether the denial would likely be 
repeated in other cases, and if so, under what specific sets of 
circumstances. Viewed ex ante, WorldCom could not have 
known that its refund claim would be denied based on then-
established precedent. This, of course, is the ultimate in uncer-
tainty. On the other hand, equitable principles are generally 
well established and well known, and their application in this 
context should not be wholly unexpected.279 Moreover, as 
precedent is developed for the use of equity in this context, cer-
tainty and predictability will likely increase.280 
2. The Innocent Investor 
One could construct a public policy argument that suggests 
it would be unfair for the IRS to retain tax overpayments that 
otherwise might be used to mitigate damages suffered by inno-
cent creditors and shareholders of a corporation that had in-
flated earnings. After all, the direct cost of any penalty gener-
ally will be borne by shareholders in addition to the potential 
indirect costs associated with the penalty.281 There are three 
responses to this argument. First, both creditors and share-
holders assume the risks of their investments in a corporation, 
including risks related to the behavior of management.282 
 
 278. But see Weisbach, supra note 270, at 24748 (arguing that the effects 
of uncertainty are difficult to predict and may, in fact, be positive). 
 279. In fact, the permanent loss of the $300 million it paid in taxes should 
not have been a surprise to WorldCom at all. Because a refund claim generally 
must be filed within three years from the time the return was filed, WorldCom 
must have expected either to forfeit the taxes paid or admit within two years 
that it had inflated its taxable income. See supra notes 14246 and accompa-
nying text. 
 280. See Kaplow, supra note 268, at 611 (To the extent laws are promul-
gated as standards, predictability will be enhanced by precedent to the extent 
precedent transforms standards into rules.). 
 281. Christopher Kennedy, Criminal Sentences for Corporations: Alterna-
tive Fining Mechanisms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 443, 44849 (1985). 
 282.  Id. at 45253 ([W]hile the possibility of large fines introduces an 
added element of risk into the shareholders investment, shareholders are 
uniquely situated to neutralize risk through diversification. What is more, this 
risk will have been reflected in lower share prices when the investor bought 
his shares. Hence the view that shareholders are innocent should be no bar to 
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Sometimes the assumption of these risks is rewarded; some-
times investors are penalized.283 Both creditors and sharehold-
ers can reduce the risk associated with unlawful conduct of 
managers in one firm by investing in many others.284 Moreover, 
under general corporate law, the shareholder enjoys immunity 
from personal liability for the actions of corporate management 
even when those actions injure third parties, including credi-
tors.285 
A second response is that a refund retained by the Treas-
ury, as proposed in this Article, is in the nature of a penalty be-
cause it is retained as a result of the taxpayers fraudulent con-
duct. The denial of a tax refund by the IRS differs from an 
outright penalty only in that it is imposed by a court out of con-
siderations of equity in the particular case, rather than as a 
matter of positive statutory law. Penalties routinely are im-
posed on corporations without consideration of their impact on 
innocent shareholders.286 As a matter of policy, penalties for 
corporate wrongdoing ought not to be waived simply because 
shareholders were not directly involved in the wrongdoing. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument would preclude 
imposition of virtually all monetary penalties on publicly 
traded corporations since shareholders bear the costs of such 
penalties but rarely are involved in management activities, 
fraudulent or not. 
 
fines that eliminate the prospective profit in criminal conduct.). Creditors 
face more risk than shareholders because they generally lack the opportunity 
to profit from corporate malfeasance. See id. at 452. However, creditors may 
attempt to manage these risks through covenants and other restrictions. 
 283. Shareholders often benefit from the crime of managers, as did World-
Com shareholders who sold stock during the run-up in the companys stock 
price. Since they bear no personal responsibility for managements criminal 
activity, shareholders have little incentive to hire managers willing to adhere 
to the law. See POSNER, supra note 269, at 464. 
 284. See Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of 
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 320 (1991) (observing that shareholders 
can reduce the risk associated with individual stock holdings in particular 
firms by owning a fully diversified portfolio of securities). 
 285. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (2005) (stating that unless a 
corporations certificate of incorporation contains a statement providing to the 
contrary, stockholders . . . of a corporation shall not be personally liable for 
the payment of the corporations debts except as they may be liable by reason 
of their own conduct or acts). 
 286. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Glassman, Commr, SEC, Remarks at the 13th 
Annual Public Fund Boards Forum: The Challenges of Striking a Regulatory 
Balance (Dec. 6, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120604cag.htm 
(expressing concern over the trend of increasing corporate penalties that too 
often hurt the investors that the SEC is supposed to protect). 
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Finally, a no-refund policy would be beneficial to share-
holders to the extent that it creates incentives for corporations 
to accurately report earnings. A corporation facing the potential 
forfeiture of all federal income taxes paid on inflated earnings 
is more likely to impose stricter internal controls to prevent  
earnings inflation and the concomitant tax fraud, than is a cor-
poration facing a maximum penalty of a few hundred thousand 
dollars. 
3. Penalty Optimality 
A third matter of public policy concern is the extent to 
which the use of equitable defenses to deny refund claims re-
sults in the effective imposition of an optimal penalty. Although 
the rationality and, thus, the efficacy of the current tax penalty 
system have been criticized, few would dispute that tax penal-
ties are necessary to insure substantial compliance with the tax 
laws.287 To achieve such compliance, the congressional Joint 
Committee on Taxation has recommended that tax penalties 
(1) encourage voluntary compliance, (2) operate fairly, (3) de-
ter undesired behavior, and (4) be designed in a manner that 
promotes efficient and effective administration of the provisions 
by the IRS.288 These elements suggest affecting taxpayer be-
havior in ways consistent with the collection of tax revenues 
and the smooth functioning of the tax system. In other words, 
the elements focus on optimality. 
The economic model of optimality is familiar. A person pre-
sumably will commit a crime if the benefits of doing so exceed 
the expected costs to him.289 Thus, if apprehension is certain, 
increasing the potential costs associated with the crime by im-
posing a penalty will deter its commission.290 Of course, appre-
 
 287. See, e.g., Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of 
Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 344 (1989) (observing that tax 
penalties are remarkably crude policy instruments, but noting that such 
penalties discourage illegal or undesirable activity). 
 288. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 31. The 
first and third of these elements seem to be after the same thing (i.e., a pen-
alty can encourage voluntary compliance only to the extent that it deters non-
compliance). 
 289. This analysis is based on Benthams theory that an individual will 
seek to maximize satisfaction and thus will be deterred from committing a 
crime if its costs exceed its benefits. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 166 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. 
Hart eds., 1970). There are other theories as well. See Zolt, supra note 287, at 
36162. 
 290. Deterrence has a particular meaning in the context of corporate crime 
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hension is never certain absent a 100 percent audit rate, which 
is not possible in an environment of limited government re-
sources. Therefore, the expected cost of a crime is the product of 
the penalty imposed and the probability of apprehension and 
conviction. Where the probability of apprehension is relatively 
low, the expected cost of the crime can be raised by increasing 
the amount of the penalty imposed.291 Given that audits are 
limited by available government resources, a high-penalty, low-
audit regime is likely to be most administratively efficient, thus 
satisfying the fourth characteristic identified by the Joint 
Committee.292 The only upper limit on the penalty amount un-
der the economic model is fairness, which is also the second 
characteristic recommended by the Joint Committee. Fairness 
entails making the penalty proportional to the crime.293 A high-
penalty regime may be considered unfair, and compliance will 
not be encouraged if the penalty does not appear to fit the 
crime.294 
By the Joint Committees standards, the current tax fraud 
penalty is a dismal failure in addressing the filing of fraudulent 
returns.295 Given the trivial dollar amount of the fine im-
posed,296 the current penalty will not deter the filing of fraudu-
lent returns by corporations, to which it clearly is intended to 
apply.297 Moreover, the current penalty lacks proportionality 
 
that relates to Benthams notion of maximizing satisfaction. Kennedy, supra 
note 281, at 450 (In evaluating the obstacles to a satisfactory rationale for 
corporate fines, it is first important to define the sort of deterrence that is 
their goal. The word deterrence is perhaps misleading in the corporate con-
text, since it connotes crime prevention through fear. But corporate fines deter 
not so much through fear as through cancellation of motive. The essence of 
fines that eliminate expected gain is simply the neutralization of one of the 
stimuli for corporate crime: the profit motive.). 
 291. See POSNER, supra note 269, at 24243 (applying economic analysis to 
crime and criminal sanctions); Kennedy, supra, note 281, at 447 (The fine 
must reduce the expected gain of a violation to zero or below, incorporating a 
multiplier to counterbalance the possibility that a violation would escape de-
tection.). 
 292. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 37. 
 293. Leo P. Martinez, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and Punishment Revis-
ited, 10 VA. TAX REV. 535, 570 (1991) (Penalties for tax offenses should be eq-
uitable, and to be equitable, they must be proportional.). 
 294. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 37. By the 
same token, a penalty that is too low also reflects a lack of proportionality and 
will tend to discourage compliance. 
 295. The criticisms leveled here apply to fraudulent understatements and 
overstatements of income and tax. 
 296. See supra notes 12228 and accompanying text. 
 297. See I.R.C. § 7206(5) (2000) (specifying the fine amount in the case of 
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because it is a fixed dollar amount that applies irrespective of 
either the financial circumstances or the culpability of the of-
fender. Thus, the penalty falls more heavily on individual tax-
payers filing fraudulent returns than it does on corporations.298 
The penalty is not likely to encourage compliance either, since 
it lacks proportionality and may therefore be viewed as unfair. 
Finally, the penalty is neither administratively efficient nor ef-
fective. Minimal revenue is likely to be collected either from the 
penalty itself or as a result of the penaltys effect in deterring 
the fraud that the statute proscribes.299 
By contrast, consider the denial of a refund claim on the 
grounds of equity. The lost refund in some cases will be quite 
high. For example, in WorldComs case, the penalty likely 
would have been around $300 million. Whether any penalty 
would have been sufficient to deter the companys earnings in-
flation is not clear.300 However, to the extent that earnings in-
flation can be deterred, a penalty of $300 million is much more 
likely to be effective than a likely maximum penalty of 
$160,000.301 Where audit probability is low, an increased pen-
alty is necessary to insure that the cost of the crime is suffi-
ciently high to at least potentially have a deterrent effect.302 
Thus, the denial of a refund is likely to achieve a greater meas-
ure of deterrence than the current penalty. 
 
 
corporations). 
 298. Much of the current system of penalties suffers from a lack of propor-
tionality. Zolt, supra note 287, at 34546. 
 299. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 300. Arguably, WorldCom executives would not have been deterred by the 
possibility that overpaid taxes would not be refundable, if they even consid-
ered the question in the first place. In fact, if the corporation expected to con-
ceal its fraud for at least as long as the three-year statute of limitations on re-
fund claims, then the decision to inflate the corporations earnings was made 
in the face of a prepaid penalty of $300 million. On the other hand, it seems 
likely that, in many cases, corporations inflating their earnings do so as a 
temporary measure, with the intention of reversing the overstatement in the 
future. 
 301. See supra notes 12227 and accompanying text. Of course, the argu-
ment that denying a refund would not deter earnings inflation in some cases 
applies with equal force to a penalty of any size that one might impose. 
 302. See POSNER, supra note 269, at 244 (If the costs of collecting fines are 
assumed to be zero regardless of the size of the fine, the most efficient combi-
nation is a probability arbitrarily close to zero and a fine arbitrarily close to 
infinity.). However, the potential penalty imposed on a given corporation in 
the form of denying a tax refund is necessarily capped at an amount equal to 
the product of the overstated earnings and the corporations effective tax rate. 
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As discussed above, the upper limit on a penalty should be 
measured by its potential to be perceived as excessive. At first 
blush, denying WorldCom a refund of $300 million in taxes 
paid on phony income might be viewed as not proportional to 
the offense. Of course, in real terms, the denial of the refund 
would be exactly proportional to the offense because it would be 
measured directly by the amount of WorldComs fraudulent 
overstatement of its tax liability. Even weighed against the po-
tential harm caused by WorldComs tax fraud, though, it is not 
clear that the denial of a refund would be excessive. A fine of 
$300 million certainly is large, but it failed to shock the con-
science of the U.S. Senate, which voted unanimously for legisla-
tion that would have imposed just such a fine.303 Perjury in its 
various forms has always been considered one of the most odi-
ous of criminal offenses.304 It was punishable by death under 
the Code of Hammurabi, Roman law, and French law.305 In 
more enlightened times, the Supreme Court has called perjury 
an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of judicial 
proceedings, and described effective restraints against this 
type of egregious offense as imperative.306 Moreover, a pen-
alty of 100 percent of an overpayment of tax is not far from the 
currently applicable civil penalty of 75 percent of any under-
statement of tax attributable to fraud.307 Considering that no  
 
 
 303. See supra notes 2426 and accompanying text. Historically, many cor-
porate fines have been absurdly low, and a number of legislatures are moving 
toward fines that reflect some multiple of the gain from prohibited conduct. 
See Kennedy, supra note 281, at 453 n.41. 
 304. See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How 
Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 
HASTINGS L.J. 157, 17475 (2001). 
 305. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Perjury Trap, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 
636 (1981). Putting aside the death penalty for the moment, the seriousness 
with which perjury is viewed is not unwarranted given the necessity for truth 
in human dealings. As one moral philosopher has said, trust in some degree 
of veracity functions as a foundation of relations among human beings; when 
this trust shatters or wears away, institutions collapse. SISSELA BOK, LYING: 
MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 31 (Vintage Books 1989) (1978). 
 306. Gershman, supra note 305, at 636 n.44 (citing United States v. Man-
dujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976)). 
 307. I.R.C. § 6663 (2000). The Supreme Court has determined that the civil 
fraud penalty is not even punitive, but rather is a remedial sanction pro-
vided primarily for revenue protection and to reimburse the government for 
the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayers 
fraud. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938) (construing a 50 
percent fraud penalty). 
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interest would attach to the amount owed, as would be the case 
in a typical underpayment situation, denial of a refund does not 
appear unduly punitive. 
The denial of a refund also achieves administrative effi-
ciency and effectiveness. It is administratively simple, requir-
ing only determination of the amount of the refund that is 
sought and verification as to whether the refund arose in con-
nection with earnings inflation.308 Further, the denial of re-
funds would yield significant returns on audit resources ex-
pended. In sum, the denial of refund claims in tax fraud cases 
involving inflated earnings is likely to have a greater deterrent 
effect, encourage compliance to a greater degree, be perceived 
as more fair, and be more administratively efficient and effec-
tive than the current penalty regime. 
IV.  APPLYING EQUITY TO REFUND CLAIMS 
So far, this Article has assessed the scope of the earnings-
inflation problem and its impact on tax reporting, examined the 
inadequacy of existing penalties to effectively discourage tax 
fraud related to earnings inflation, reviewed both the equitable 
pedigree of tax-refund claims and the equitable defenses that 
might be asserted in response to such claims, and discussed 
various relevant public policy issues. The remainder of the Ar-
ticle discusses how the IRS can establish the connection be-
tween earnings inflation on the one hand, and a claim for re-
fund of taxes paid on the inflated earnings on the other. This 
part of the Article concludes with an assessment of the roles of 
both the IRS and the Joint Committee in asserting equitable 
defenses to refund claims. 
A. ESTABLISHING THE TAX-FRAUD CONNECTION 
Until recently, no simple mechanism existed for determin-
ing whether a particular refund claim was linked to earnings 
inflation and therefore should be denied. That is, there was no 
easy way of linking a given tax-refund claim to fraudulent ac-
tivity on the part of the corporate taxpayer that might give rise 
to an equitable defense to the claim. In a case such as World-
Coms, where the accounting fraud was widely reported by the  
 
 
 
 308. The administration of refunds under this approach is discussed in 
greater detail in infra Part IV. 
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media, the IRS could, of course, ferret out the tax fraud that 
masked the earnings inflation. However, not all cases would 
necessarily be as publicly visible. 
Fortunately, this knowledge gap will be eliminated for tax 
years ending on or after December 31, 2004. In an effort to in-
crease the transparency of corporate tax return filings in gen-
eral, Treasury and the IRS have issued Schedule M-3, which 
would replace the current Schedule M-1 on which a corporation 
reconciles the difference between its book income and taxable 
income.309 Importantly, the new Schedule M-3 asks the report-
ing corporation whether it has restated its financials for peri-
ods covered by the schedule and, if so, requests an explanation 
of each item restated.310 This new form will permit the IRS to 
establish the necessary nexus between accounting fraud, on the 
one hand, and tax fraud, on the other. During IRS processing, a 
Schedule M-3 that indicates that earnings were restated in the 
year for which the refund is claimed should immediately trig-
ger closer scrutiny. 
For example, assume that a company like WorldCom files 
an amended return requesting a refund of taxes paid on 
fraudulently inflated income. Because the company has to show 
on Schedule M-3 that it has restated its earnings, the IRS will 
be able to investigate the relationship between the earnings in-
flation and the refund claim. If the investigation indicates that 
the company was engaged in accounting fraud and falsified its 
original tax return to conceal the fraud, the IRS should then 
impose liability under I.R.C. § 7206(1)311 and deny the refund 
claim based on the doctrine of unclean hands or another appli-
cable equitable defense.312 
 
 309. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, Treasury and IRS Issue 
Revised Tax Form for Corporate Tax Returns (July 7, 2004), http:// 
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=124997,00.html; Press Release, Office of 
Public Affairs, Treasury Department, Treasury and IRS Issue Final Version of 
Tax Form for Corporate Tax Returns (Oct. 25, 2004), http://www.treas.gov/ 
press/releases/js2058.htm. 
 310. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SCHEDULE M-3 (FORM 1120), NET INCOME 
(LOSS) RECONCILIATION FOR CORPORATIONS WITH TOTAL ASSETS OF $10 MIL-
LION OR MORE (OMB NO. 1545-0123) 1 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-utl/final_m-3_form_102504.pdf. 
 311. I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000). 
 312. Violation of § 7206(1) would constitute the bad conduct needed to sup-
port the IRSs denial of the companys refund claim based on the defense of 
unclean hands. As discussed in supra Part III.C, the doctrine of unclean hands 
requires bad conduct on the part of the taxpayer. Although such conduct need 
not rise to the level of a statutory violation, such a violation clearly establishes 
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B. EXPANDING JOINT COMMITTEE REVIEW 
A policy of denying certain tax-refund claims on grounds of 
equity should reflect the limits of IRS resources by targeting 
only sizable tax-refund claims. One approach would be to link 
equitable review of tax-refund claims to the existing review of 
large refunds that the congressional Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion is statutorily required to undertake.313 Under current law, 
a refund in excess of $2 million may not be paid until after the 
expiration of thirty days from the date on which a report sum-
marizing the proposed refund is submitted for review to the 
Joint Committee.314 The report must specify the name of the 
person (or entity) to whom the refund or credit is to be made, 
the amount of the refund or credit, and a summary of the rele-
vant facts.315 The report mandated by § 6405 is prepared by 
 
that the taxpayer has unclean hands. See supra notes 21015 and accompany-
ing text. 
 313. The Joint Committee is comprised of five members of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee and five members of the House Ways and Means Committee 
(in each case, three of the five are members of the majority party, while two 
are members of the minority party). I.R.C. § 8002 (2000). The Joint Committee 
was created by Congress in 1926 to exercise oversight of the Bureau of Inter-
nal Revenue (the precursor to the IRS). See Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 
69-20, § 1203, 44 Stat. 9, 12728. The Bureau of Internal Revenue was widely 
viewed at the time as serving the interests of the very wealthy at the expense 
of ordinary taxpayers. See, e.g., 68 CONG. REC. S2364 (1927) (statement of Sen. 
Heflin) (arguing that through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Republicans 
controlled the taxing power of the nation and were using that power to im-
poverish the masses and to enrich a favored few). Senator James Couzens 
was rewarded with a notice for more than $10 million in back taxes in re-
sponse to his public criticism of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for its valua-
tion of oil properties. Recommendations of the National Commission on Re-
structuring the IRS on Executive Branch Governance and Congressional 
Oversight of the IRS: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways and Means H.R., 
105th Cong. 17778 (statement of Kenneth J. Kies, Chief of Staff, Joint 
Comm. on Taxation). Then-Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, who had bene-
fited from the Bureaus valuation as the principal owner of Gulf Oil, was be-
lieved to be responsible for the retaliation. Id. Senator Couzenss investigation 
led to the creation of the Joint Committee. Id. 
 314. I.R.C. § 6405(a) (2000). Concerned about the integrity of the refund 
process, Congress expanded the Joint Committees mandate two years after its 
creation by requiring that all tax refunds in excess of $75,000 be reported to, 
and reviewed by, the Joint Committee before they were paid. See Revenue Act 
of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 710, 45 Stat. 791, 882. The current review 
threshold of $2,000,000 was set by section 305 of the Community Renewal Tax 
Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 305, 114 Stat 2763, 2763A-634. 
 315. I.R.C. § 6045(a). The statute also requires that the report include the 
decision of the Secretary, but this provision seems superfluous because there 
would be no refund to trigger the reporting requirement unless the Secretary 
had determined to pay the refund claim. 
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personnel within the IRS and submitted to the Joint Commit-
tee. The report is then reviewed by staff attorneys working un-
der the supervision of the Joint Committees Chief of Staff.316 If 
no problems appear on the face of the report, the Joint Commit-
tee notifies the IRS that it has no objection to payment of the 
refund.317 
Whether the Joint Committee plays a sufficiently active 
role in reviewing tax refunds and whether it even has any ac-
tual authority has been debated periodically in Congress since 
shortly after the Committees inception.318 It is safe to say, 
however, that for decades Joint Committee review has served 
no meaningful limiting function with respect to the payment of 
refunds.319 This Article proposes that the Joint Committee be 
involved in assessing the viability of equity cases. When pre-
sented with a report from the IRS regarding a refund claim in 
excess of $2 million that arises in connection with earnings-
inflation activity by the taxpayer, the Joint Committee would 
evaluate the applicability of the various equitable defenses 
 
 316. The Joint Committee staff is responsible for a number of other activi-
ties, including assisting members of Congress in preparing bills for introduc-
tion, facilitating Ways and Means Committee and Finance Committee mark-
ups of tax legislation, and drafting the explanation of legislation contained in 
the reports of the Ways and Means, Finance and Conference Committees. See 
Donald L. Korb et al., Rethinking Refund Review: Understanding the Joint 
Committee on Taxation, CORP. BUS. TAXN MONTHLY, Nov. 2002, at 3, 4. 
 317. Note that § 6405(a) does not specifically grant the Joint Committee 
veto power over the payment of large refunds; it merely requires a thirty-day 
delay period. As a practical matter, however, the IRS will not generally issue 
such refunds without Joint Committee approval. See Diana Lisa Erbsen, The 
Joint Tax Committee Refund Review Function: Is It Worth a Damn?, 72 TAX 
NOTES 227, 23031 (1996). The grant of veto authority to the Committee has 
been proposed. Id. at 228 n.15. However, a Joint Committee power to approve 
or disapprove the issuance of refunds would create a legislative veto over ex-
ecutive branch action in violation of the Constitution. See INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (holding that congressional veto of an executive branch 
decision to suspend the deportation of an alien constituted legislative action 
that required approval of both houses of Congress and presentation to the 
president). 
 318. The initial efforts of the Joint Committee to review large refunds were 
unimpressive and were the subject of a heated floor debate in the House on 
January 5, 1929. See Erbsen, supra note 317, at 22930. Clearly, the Joint 
Committee could play a meaningful role in limiting refunds. However, as a 
practical matter, the IRS will not issue large refunds without Joint Committee 
approval, notwithstanding the absence of an absolute Joint Committee veto. 
Id. 
 319. Id. (noting that procedures followed by the contemporary Joint Com-
mittee do not vary significantly from the procedures that were criticized in the 
1920s). 
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based on the conduct of the taxpayer and advise the IRS in ap-
propriate cases to deny the refund claim on such grounds. Im-
porting the consideration of equitable defenses into the rather 
perfunctory Joint Committee review would perhaps provide the 
impetus for an expanded role for the Joint Committee staff in 
this area. 
CONCLUSION 
It is not yet clear whether congressional and SEC re-
sponses will stem the tide of earnings inflation by U.S. corpora-
tions, but it is quite possible that earnings inflation may be a 
persistent phenomenon that has simply been highlighted by the 
recent weakness in the economy.320 To the extent that earnings 
inflation persists, it will continue to pose problems for the tax 
system because of the utility of fraudulent tax reporting in con-
cealing accounting fraud. 
Like all tax fraud, overstatement of taxable income creates 
additional administrative burdens for the IRS and Treasury. 
Once fraud on a tax return is discovered, the IRS must be espe-
cially diligent in its investigation because the taxpayer has 
demonstrated a propensity toward dishonesty and falsehood. In 
particular, fraud cases involve a greater likelihood that, in ad-
dition to the tax return, the taxpayers underlying records have 
also been falsified. Where income has been overstated by the 
taxpayer, there is a concern that the overstatement may con-
ceal falsely inflated deductions. Tax fraud also makes it more 
difficult for the IRS to determine the tax liability of other per-
sons whose income, deductions or credits are in some way re-
lated to the taxpayer. Perhaps most importantly, tax fraud 
tends to undermine the integrity of the tax system. Where 
fraud is common, the government cannot be confident that the 
records and returns upon which tax liabilities, and therefore 
government revenues, are based are truthful and accurate. Un-
punished tax fraud, in turn, tends to discourage the voluntary 
compliance upon which the tax system relies. Thus, penalizing 
tax fraud where there is an overstatement of income or an 
overpayment of tax is supported by substantial policy consid-
erations. 
 
 
 
 320. See Eduardo Porter, More Corporate Crime, or Just Prosecutions?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, at WK12. 
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Given these policy considerations, it is unconscionable that 
a taxpayer should not only avoid significant penalties, but also 
readily receive a refund of taxes in excess of what was really 
owed along with interest on the overpayment. Unfortunately, 
that is exactly the way the current system works. The use of 
equity to deny refunds in such cases, as proposed in this Arti-
cle, would serve as a meaningful penalty where no penalty of 
substance presently exists. A penalty imposed by equity is con-
sistent with the growing consensus that standards, as opposed 
to rules, may be more effective in dealing with tax fraud. Re-
cent attempts to codify the economic substance doctrine first 
articulated in Knetsch in 1969, attest to the perceived, contin-
ued usefulness of overarching standards to fill the inevitable 
gaps created by legal rules.321 Nor would equity in this context 
do undue injury to innocent shareholders, given general agency 
principles, notions of shareholder risk, and risk management. 
Compared to the present system, the penalty imposed by equity 
would much more closely approach optimality in terms of the 
governments stated criteria of deterrent effect, encouragement 
of voluntary compliance, perceived fairness and proportionality, 
and efficiency and effectiveness of administration.322 
Based on these considerations, the IRS should begin to 
move in the direction suggested by this Article by identifying 
earnings-inflation-related tax-refund claims. This step in the 
process will be fortuitously aided by the newly revised Schedule 
M-3 to the corporate tax return, which will provide the IRS 
with previously unavailable information to link tax fraud to 
earnings inflation. The IRS should include in its tax-refund re-
ports to the Joint Committee a summary of any fraudulent ac-
tivity engaged in by the taxpayer, and its relationship to the 
tax fraud. For its part, the Joint Committee should evaluate 
large refund claims in light of equitable principles and recom-
mend that the IRS deny refund claims in appropriate circum-
stances. 
 
 321. See supra notes 26677 and accompanying text. 
 322. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 31. 
